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Comment
The Fruit Does Not Fall Far From the Tree:
The Unresolved Tax Treatment of Contingent
Attorney's Fees
Kristina Maynard*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated, "[i]t is not a
feasible judicial undertaking to achieve global equity in taxation ...."I
The importance of this statement becomes apparent when viewed in the
context of the continuing controversy surrounding the taxation of
2
contingent attorney's fees.
The overall goal of the federal government with respect to income
taxes is to impose the burden of tax on individuals according to their
relative ability to pay.3 To achieve this goal, the federal government
employs a progressive tax system. 4 The federal tax scheme, through the
*
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thanks to Jeffrey L. Kwall for his insightful comments during the development of this article.
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and encouragement guided me throughout the writing process.
1. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Kenseth 11](holding
that the contingent fee portion of a taxpayer's lawsuit settlement was includible in his gross
income); see also Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2000)
(acknowledging that equitable arguments cannot overcome the plain meaning of a statute). The
traditional theory of tax equity provides that similarly situated taxpayers should pay an equal
amount of tax. See Darren J. Campbell, Wiping the Slate Clean: An Examination of How a
Court's Characterization of Contingent Attorney's Fees Implicates Alternative Minimum Tax and
Affects the Taxpayers, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 171, 172 (2001).
2. See Bernard J. Grant, No Taxation Without Realization: Srivastava v. Commissioner, The
Fifth Circuit's Answer to Tax Treatment of Attorney's Fees Under a Contingency Fee Agreement,
32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 363, 364-65 (2001) (noting the potential problems with using principles of
equity to resolve the question of taxation of contingent attorney's fees).
3. Id. (citing Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1906 (1987)).
4. Id.
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Internal Revenue Code, attempts to achieve neutral taxation by applying5
graduated tax rates to individuals on the basis of incremental income.
Although this system of taxation is widely accepted, the determination
of what constitutes income and to whom such income should be taxed
are topics vigorously debated by courts, tax practitioners and
6
commentators.
One such area of debate surrounds the question of the appropriate
taxation of contingent attorney's fees. 7
In joining an already
contentious circuit split, 8 the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed the
United States Tax Court in the case of Kenseth v. Commissioner,
holding that contingent attorney's fees incurred in obtaining a taxable
10
recovery 9 must be included in the taxpayer's gross income.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1940) (holding that "realization" may
occur prior to actual receipt of gross income); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930)
(defining gross income to include anticipatory transfers by one taxpayer of income earned by him
to another taxpayer); Old Colony Trust v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (discussing the
definition of income in the context of payment of federal income taxes by an employer on behalf
of his employee); Comm'r v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that
the payment to employees of non-cash property constitutes "realization" for income tax
purposes); see also infra Part II.B-C (discussing gross income, realization, and the assignmentof-income doctrine).
7. See Grant, supra note 2, at 365. A contingent fee is a "'contract for the provision of legal
services in which the amount of the lawyer's fee is contingent in whole or in part upon the
successful outcome of the case, either through settlement or litigation."' See Allison F. Aranson,
Note, The United States Percentage Contingent Fee System: Ridicule and Reform from An
International Perspective, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 755, 757 (1992) (quoting Alan A. Paterson,
Contingent Fees and Their Rivals, 1989 SCOTS LAW TIMES (NEWS) 81, 81).
8. Prior to the decision in Kenseth II, a split existed in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
Eleventh and Federal Circuits. See Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 2001);
Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2001); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 365
(5th Cir. 2000); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941, 943-44 (9th Cir. 2000); Coady v.
Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th
Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2000);
Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532,
532 (3d Cir. 1963); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1959); see also infra Part
HI.A-B (discussing the differing tax treatment of contingent attorney's fees among the circuits).
9. The issue concerning the proper tax treatment of contingent attorney's fees does not arise in
cases where a client's recovery is not taxable. See Douglas G. Hickel, Comment, Losing in the
Tax System After You Win in the Court System: Should Contingent Legal Fees Paid to the
Attorney Be Included in the Taxpayer-Client's Gross Income?, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
477, 496 (2001). Courts first apply the "in lieu of' test to determine whether a lawsuit recovery
should be included in gross income. Id. at 494. The "in lieu of' test is applied by determining if
the recovery obtained by a taxpayer is meant to replace some amount of income that would
normally be taxable. Id. at 495. If the recovery was paid in lieu of taxable income, such as back
pay, then the recovery is included in gross income. Id. If the recovery replaced non-taxable
income, like damages for physical injury, then the recovery is excluded from gross income. Id.;
see also infra note 222 (citing I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) which exempts from tax certain lawsuit
recoveries related to physical injuries). With regard to legal fees paid to obtain a recovery,
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Consistent with the Seventh Circuit, the Third, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth and
Federal Circuits all held that a taxpayer's gross income includes
contingent legal fees paid to obtain a taxable recovery, I I while the Fifth,
determined that such fees are not gross
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
12
taxpayer.
the
income to
Despite years of controversy, the proper income tax treatment of
contingent attorney's fees remains unclear. 13 Proponents of inclusion
expenses allocable to tax-exempt income are not deductible. I.R.C. § 265(a)(1) (1994).
Therefore, if a taxpayer's recovery is excluded from gross income, both the non-taxable recovery
and the related legal fees are not reported on the taxpayer's tax return. See I.R.C. § 265(a)(1).
Section 265(a)(1) states:
General rule.-No deduction shall be allowed for(]) Expenses.-Any amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to
one or more classes of income other than interest (whether or not any amount of
income of that class or classes is received or accrued) wholly exempt from the taxes
imposed by this subtitle, or any amount otherwise allowable under section 212
(relating to expenses for production of income) which is allocable to interest (whether
or not any amount of such interest is received or accrued) wholly exempt from the
taxes imposed by this subtitle.
Id.
10. Kenseth 11, 259 F.3d 881,883 (7th Cir. 2001).
11. See Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to her attorney resulting from a sexual harassment
lawsuit against her former employer); Sinyard, 268 F.3d at 759 (holding that a taxpayer must
include the contingent fees paid to his attorneys related to a class action age discrimination claim
against his former employer); Kenseth 11, 259 F.3d at 885 (holding that a taxpayer must include
the contingent attorney's fees paid resulting from an age discrimination suit against his former
employer); Young, 240 F.3d at 379 (holding that the taxpayer must include the contingent
attorney's fees paid in settling a property dispute incident to a divorce); Benci-Woodward, 219
F.3d at 943-44 (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to his attorney
resulting from tort and contract claims against his former employer); Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190
(holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to her attorney related to a
wrongful termination suit against her former employer); Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455 (holding that a
partnership taxpayer must include the attorney's fees paid in connection with a condemnation
lawsuit against the State of Maryland); O'Brien, 319 F.2d at 532 (holding that a taxpayer must
include the contingent fees paid to his attorney related to a wrongful discharge action against his
former employer); see also infra Part IIL.B (discussing the inclusion of contingent fees in gross
income).
12. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 365 (holding that a taxpayer could exclude the contingent fees
paid to his attorney in connection with a defamation claim against a television station); Davis,
210 F.3d at 1347 (holding that a taxpayer could exclude the contingent fees paid to her attorney
for his assistance related to her claims against a mortgage company for fraud, conspiracy, and
breach of contract); Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858 (holding that a taxpayer could exclude the
contingent attorney's fees paid by a decedent's estate related to a lawsuit against the decedent's
former employer); Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126 (holding that a taxpayer could exclude the contingent
fees paid to her attorney for his services related her claim to enforce an oral contract against an
intestate decedent's estate); see also infra Part III.A (discussing the exclusion of contingent fees
from gross income).
13. See Benjamin C. Rasmussen, Taxation of An Attorney's Contingency Fee of a Punitive
Damages Recovery: The Srivastava Approach, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 301, 301 (2001).
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cite the plain language of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code")' 4 as well
as the judicially defined assignment-of-income doctrine 15 as the basis
for their position.16 Critics argue that the Code deduction provisions,
which reduce the efficacy of deductible expenses such as attorney's
fees, create harsh and unfair results to taxpayers who must include such
fees in their gross income. 17 They propose, instead, that taxpayers
reduce any taxable recovery by the amount paid in contingent attorney's
18
fees, and report only the net recovery in gross income.
This Comment first considers the nature and usage of the contingent
attorney's fee contract. 19 It then provides an overview of basic
principles of gross income and realization, including the origin and
development of the assignment-of-income doctrine. 20 Part II of this
Comment next explores the Code limitations on deductions for legal
fees that create the harsh tax consequences of inclusion. 2 1 It then
addresses the unique limitations of the Alternative Minimum Tax
("AMT") 22 that often subject unsuspecting taxpayers to additional tax
liability.23 Finally, Part II examines the treatment of contingent
attorney's fees in the Tax Court. 24 Part III of this Comment then
explores the treatment of contingent attorney's fees among the various
United States Courts of Appeals, with a particular emphasis on the
14. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994) (defining gross income); see also infra Part II.B (discussing
gross income under the Internal Revenue Code).
15. The assignment-of-income doctrine requires a taxpayer to pay tax on all income owned or
controlled by him, regardless of whether the taxpayer received the income directly. See
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117 (1940); see also infra Part I.C (discussing the origin and
development of the assignment-of-income doctrine).
16. See Grant, supra note 2, at 381.
17. See Lauren E. Sheridan, Trees in the Orchard or Fruitfrom the Trees?: The Case for
Excluding Attorney's Contingent Feesfrom the Client's Gross Income, 36 GA. L. REV. 283, 31113 (2001) (discussing the harsh consequences of the disallowance of some miscellaneous
itemized deductions, including legal fees, under I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i)).
18. See James Serven, Tenth Circuit Joins Majority View on Contingent Attorney's Fee Issue,
94 TAX NOTEs 373, 373 (2002), availableat LEXIS, 2002 TNT 15-32.
19. See infra Part II.A (exploring the nature and application of the contingency fee contract).
20. See infra Part II.B-C (discussing gross income and realization as well as the origin and
development of the assignment-of-income doctrine).
21. See infra Part II.D (examining the limitations on deductions affecting contingent
attorney's fees).
22. See I.R.C. §§ 55-58 (1994). For individual taxpayers, the AMT is a separate and parallel
tax system computed each year on taxable income after adjustments. See I.R.C. § 55(b); see also
infra note 124 and accompanying text (examining the computation of the alternative minimum
tax).
23. See infra Part II.E (discussing the relevant AMT disallowance rules on itemized
deductions).
24. See infra Part II.F (examining the position of the Tax Court with respect to contingent
attorney's fees).
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Seventh Circuit's decision in Kenseth v. Commissioner.25 Part IV then
critically analyzes why the courts requiring the inclusion of contingent
attorney's fees in gross income are correct and why the equity-based
arguments of the courts holding to the contrary cannot succeed.2 6
Finally, in light of the absence of a consensus on this issue, Part V
proposes that the United States Supreme Court should resolve the
current circuit split by requiring contingent attorney's fees to be
included in gross income. 27 In addition, Part V proposes that Congress
should make two technical amendments to the Internal Revenue Code
that would allow an unrestricted deduction for contingent
attorney's
28
recovery.
taxable
a
of
production
the
in
fees incurred
II. BACKGROUND

The proper income tax treatment of contingent attorney's fees 29 can
only be resolved through an analysis of the character of such fees, both
as an item of income and as a potential deduction. 30 While the Internal
Revenue Code is the starting point for this analysis, judicial
interpretation through case law also plays a crucial role. 3 1 Also
essential is an understanding of the contingent fee contract and of the
basic tax concepts that serve as the foundation for the differing
treatment of contingent attorney's fees. 32 In addition, an appreciation
for the consistent analysis used by the Tax Court is imperative to
33
evaluating the dichotomy that exists among the Circuits.

25. See infra Part ILA-B (examining the reasoning of the Courts of Appeals with regard to
contingent attorney's fees).
26. See infra Part IV.A-B (discussing the tax implications of the inclusion and exclusion of
contingent attorney's fees).
27. See infra Part V.A (suggesting that the Supreme Court resolve the circuit split regarding
contingent attorney's fees).
28. See infra Part V.B (proposing that Congress amend the Internal Revenue Code to allow
preferential deductions for attorney's fees in connection with taxable recoveries).
29. See infra Part H.A (explaining the nature of contingent attorney's fee contracts).
30. See infra Part H.B-E (discussing the characterization of gross income and deductions).
31. See infra Part II.B-F (reviewing the concepts of gross income and deductions as well as
the assignment-of-income doctrine).
32. See infra Part II.A-E (examining contingent attorney's fee arrangements and basic
principles of taxation).
33. See infra Part IL.F (discussing the view of the Tax Court regarding the taxation of
contingent attorney's fees).
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A. The ContingentAttorney's Fee Contract
For at least a century, attorneys and clients in the United States have
used contingent fee contracts for legal services. 34 Under a contingent
fee contract, an attorney agrees to provide legal services on behalf of a
client, and the client agrees to pay the attorney a percentage of whatever
recovery is eventually realized from the resolution of his claim. 35 If the
client does not recover, he is not required to pay for the legal services
provided under the contract. 36 Thus, for the attorney, the contingent fee
arrangement contains an element of risk that the resolution of a claim
will not be favorable for the client. 37 When a client successfully
recovers, however, the arrangement often rewards the attorney with a
substantial fee. 38 Because a contingent fee arrangement shifts the risk
of loss to the attorney, such contracts typically call for the successful
client to pay a significant percentage of his claim to his attorney. 39 As a
than
result, this arrangement often provides a higher fee to the attorney
40
he would otherwise receive under the usual hourly fee contract.
The incentive to employ a contingent fee arrangement is not one42
sided. 4 A client may also benefit from the use of such a contract.
Under a contingent fee arrangement, a client, who may not otherwise be

34. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 526, 538-41 (1986) (discussing
contingent attorney's fees in the context of domestic relations cases); see also Wylie v. Coxe, 56
U.S. 415, 418-20 (1853) (recognizing contingent fee contracts by permitting a plaintiffs attorney
to recover a contingent fee of five percent on the amount recovered on the client's claim against a
foreign government); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (defining the contingent fee
contract).
35. The typical contingent fee paid to an attorney ranges from 25% to 50% depending on the
stage at which the case is resolved. See Angela Wennihan, Let's Put the Contingency Back in the
Contingency Fee, 49 SMU L. REV. 1639, 1643 (1996). Although the most common type of
contingent fee contract is one which is based on a percentage of the plaintiff's recovery, a
contingent fee can also be figured by the hour, meaning that the attorney bills the client for the
total hours spent on the claim only if the representation has been successful. See Stewart Jay, The
Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 813, 814 (1989).
36. See Jay, supra note 35, at 814. Generally, the unsuccessful client would still be
responsible for court costs. Id.
37. See Aranson, supra note 7, at 757 (noting that contingent fee contracts shift the risk of loss
from the client to the attorney).
38. Id.
39. Id. The fee is usually based on a percentage of the plaintiff's gross recovery. Id. at 760.
Alternatively, the fee may be based on the net recovery, which is the gross recovery after
litigation expenses. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 757-58.
42. Id.
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able to afford competent counsel, receives legal assistance without
43
having to pay up-front for the services.
Although the ability to manipulate risk and reward encourages the
widespread use of contingent fee contracts by clients and attorneys,
these contracts have important tax implications with regard to gross
44
income and realization.
B. Back to the Basics: Gross Income and Realization
Gross income and realization are foundational tax concepts that are
vital to analyzing the proper tax treatment of contingent attorney's
fees.4 5 The Code plainly defines gross income as "all income from
whatever source derived," except as otherwise provided by law. 4 6
43. ld.; see also Alfred D. Youngwood, The Contingent Fee-A Reasonable Alternative?, 28
MOD. L. REV. 330, 330 (1965) (discussing the advantages of a contingency fee arrangement to a
client who may otherwise be unable to afford representation).
44. Youngwood, supra note 43, at 331-32; see also Aranson, supra note 7, at 760 (noting the
acceptance of contingent fee contracts in all fifty states). Although contingent fee contracts may
be used in many types of litigation, they are most commonly used in personal injury cases. See
Aranson, supra note 7, at 760. Because of the concern for corruption of the legal process,
however, contingent fees are prohibited in criminal cases, family cases, and in legislative
lobbying. Id. at 760-61; see also infra Part II.B (discussing the principles of gross income and
realization).
45. See Grant, supra note 2, at 370-72 (discussing gross income and realization in the context
of contingent attorney's fees).
46. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994). While the Code does not specifically mention all items of gross
income intended to be included, courts construe the definition of gross income broadly in
accordance with Congress' intent to tax income comprehensively. See Comm'r v. Jacobson, 336
U.S. 28, 49 (1949). The Supreme Court in Jacobson stated that "income taxed is described in
sweeping terms and should be broadly construed in accordance with an obvious purpose to tax
income comprehensively. The exemptions, on the other hand, are specifically stated and should
be construed with restraint in the light of the same policy." Id. The Sixteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution grants Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Section 61(a) states:
(a) General definition-Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income
means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the
following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and
similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
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Congress intentionally defined gross income broadly so as to encompass
any realized economic benefit over which a taxpayer exercises complete
control.4 7 Thus, the determination of whether an accrued benefit must
be included in a taxpayer's gross income depends upon when he realizes
the income and whether he exercises control over the income or its
source.

48

Although, ordinarily, realization occurs when a taxpayer receives
income, the obligation to pay tax may accrue even where a taxpayer
does not take possession of income directly. 49 For example, the
Supreme Court held that the payment by a third party of a taxpayer's
debt, such as an employer who pays the federal income taxes of an
50
employee, is equivalent to receipt of gross income by the taxpayer.
The rationale for this conclusion is that an identical economic benefit is
conferred on the taxpayer, whether the third party pays him directly or
pays another on his behalf.5 1 Thus, the requirement of realization does
not mean that a taxpayer, who fully enjoys an economic gain by virtue

(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust
I.R.C. § 61(a).
47. See I.R.C. § 61(a); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961) (defining gross
income to include any gain from which a taxpayer derives readily realizable economic value);
Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (holding any benefit that accrues to a
taxpayer should be included in gross income if it has created an "undeniable accession to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayer has complete dominion").
48. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1940). "Realization" occurs when the
taxpayer takes the last step necessary to ensure fruition of an economic gain. Id. at 115. The
concept of realization was founded on a desire for administrative convenience and sets the time at
which the taxpayer is taxed as the final event of enjoyment of the income. Id. at 116; see also
Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that "income or gain is not
taxed until it is 'realized"').
49. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929). The plaintiff in this case was
the President of American Woolen Company. Id. at 719. In 1916, the company adopted a
resolution whereby it agreed to pay the income taxes due on the salary of all officers of the
corporation. Id. at 719-20. The plaintiff did not report these tax payments made on his behalf in
his gross income in 1919 and 1920. Id. The Court held that the form of the payment was
irrelevant and that the payment of tax by an employer is in consideration of services rendered by
the employee. Id. at 729.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Court reasoned that the discharge by a third party of an obligation owed by a
taxpayer is the same as receipt of income by the taxpayer from the third party. Id.
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of a right to receive income, can avoid taxation merely because he has
52
not taken possession of the income.
Although realization of income cannot occur until the taxpayer
enjoys a benefit, the enjoyment of income may occur prior to its receipt;
for example, the taxpayer transfers his right to receive or control income
accrued to him in exchange for something of value. 53 When a taxpayer
realizes such a benefit, it follows that the obligation to pay tax also
accrues. 54 Therefore, the underlying rationale for the concept of
realization requires that the person who owns or controls the source of
an item of income is responsible for the tax on that income. 55 This
important concept serves as the basis for the assignment-of-income
56
doctrine.
C. The Evolution of the Assignment-of-Income Doctrine
An analysis of gross income not only involves whether a transaction
generates gross income, it also involves identifying the taxpayer to
whom the gross income is attributable. 57 For example, when a taxpayer
earns the right to receive income, but transfers that right to another
taxpayer, it is often unclear which taxpayer owes the tax on the income
when it is eventually received. 58 The judicially developed assignmentof-income doctrine provides the framework necessary to answer this

52. Horst, 311 U.S. at 117 (holding a donor taxable on interest income from negotiable bond
coupons gifted to his son).
53. Id. at 116 (stating that a taxpayer realizes income when he "has made such use or
disposition of his power to receive or control the income as to procure in its place other
satisfactions which are of economic worth"). The Court listed specific examples of enjoyment
that could occur prior to the receipt of income, including the procurement of payment directly to
creditors or funding of an irrevocable trust. Id.
The rule, founded on administrative convenience, is only one of postponement of the
tax to the final event of enjoyment of the income ... and not one of exemption from
taxation where the enjoyment is consummated by some event other than the taxpayer's
personal receipt of money or property.
Id.
54. Old Colony Trust Co., 279 U.S. at 729.
55. Horst, 311 U.S. at 116-17 (stating that "he, who owns or controls the source of the
income, also controls the disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the
payment from himself to others as a means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants"); see also
Gait v. Comm'r, 216 F.2d 41, 46 (7th Cir. 1954) (holding that a taxpayer, who distributed a
percentage of his betting receipts under a lease to his children, controlled the asset from which the
payment arose, and was thus liable for the tax on the income).
56. See infra Part II.C (examining the origin and development of the assignment-of-income
doctrine).
57. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
58. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 116 (examining the question of who should pay tax on an economic
gain accrued to one taxpayer, but received by another through a transfer).

1000

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

question. 59 From the doctrine's origin in the Supreme Court over
seventy years ago, assignment of income principles continue to be
6
applied and developed through case law. 0
1. Origin of the Assignment-of-Income Doctrine
Utilizing a progressive income tax system, the federal government
achieves its goal of taxing individuals in proportion to their relative
61
ability to pay by separating a taxpayer's income into five brackets.
The system then taxes the income within each bracket at progressively
higher rates. 62 By doing so, the first dollars earned by a taxpayer are
taxed at a lower rate than the last dollars earned.6 3 This progressive rate
structure provides an incentive to reduce income and it did not take long
for sophisticated taxpayers to discover that splitting income between
two or more individuals would reduce overall tax liability. 64 The
disapproval by the IRS of the allocation of income in this way
eventually led the Supreme Court to develop the assignment-of-income
doctrine.

65

The origin of the assignment-of-income doctrine is traceable to the
case of Lucas v. Earl.66 In Earl, a husband and wife agreed that all
property held or acquired by them during their marriage would be
59. Id. (examining the origin and development of the assignment-of-income doctrine as the
basis for determining the appropriate taxpayer); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text
(defining the assignment-of-income doctrine).
60. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the origin of the assignment of income doctrine); infra
Part II.C.2 (examining the development of the assignment of income doctrine through case law).
61. I.R.C. § 1 (1994); see also Grant, supra note 2, at 364-65 (discussing the goal of
proportional taxation).
62. I.R.C. § 1. In 2001, for married persons filing jointly and surviving spouses, the tax rates
were: 15% of all income under $45,200, 27.5% of all income over $45,200 but less than
$109,250, 30.5% of all income over $109,250 but less than $166,500, 35.5% of all income over
$166,500 but less than $297,350, and 39.1% of all income over $297,350. See I.R.S. Pub. 17, at
272 (2001). For unmarried individuals, except for surviving spouses and heads of household, the
tax rates are: 15% of all income under $27,050, 27.5% of all income over $27,050 but less than
$65,550, 30.5% of all income over $65,550 but less than $136,750, 35.5% of all income over
$136,750 but less than $297,350, and 39.1% of all income over $297,350. See id.
63. See I.R.C. § 1.
64. See Sheridan, supra note 17, at 290 (citing Pfluger v. Comm'r, 840 F.2d 1379, 1384 n.10
(7th Cir. 1988)). "By splitting one's income between two entities or people, a taxpayer gets two
trips through the lower brackets, resulting in a lower overall tax bill." Id.
65. See id. at 291; infra notes 66-102 and accompanying text (discussing the history and
application of the assignment-of-income doctrine). The doctrine arises from the need to address
the question of "who" the taxpayer is with respect to a particular transaction. See infra notes 6679. Because this issue is addressed by statute only in certain circumstances, the doctrine, in its
origin and nature, is substantially a judicial one. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
66. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930) (holding a husband taxable on wages earned by
him despite his contractual arrangement to transfer one-half of the income to his wife).
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owned by them equally. 67 Later, Mr. Earl earned income from services
as an attorney. 68 The couple reported this income separately, one-half
each, according to their agreement, and paid a smaller aggregate amount
of tax under the graduated tax69rates than they would have if Mr. Earl
had reported his income in full.
However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner")
objected and sought to tax Mr. Earl individually for the entire amount of
income earned by him.7 ° The Supreme Court agreed with the
Commissioner and required Mr. Earl to pay the entire amount of tax
related to his income. 7 1 The Court's decision was not based on the plain
language of the Code. 72 Rather, the Court used principles of statutory
construction in holding that Congress intended for the Code to impose
tax on income to the person who earns it, not to the person who receives
it under an assignment. 73 The Court concluded that, even where an
anticipatory contract provides for an item of income to completely
bypass the taxpayer's possession, that taxpayer is still responsible for

67.

Id. at 113-14. The contract stated that:
[A]ny property either of us now has or may hereafter acquire ... in any way, either by
earnings ... or any rights by contract or otherwise, during the existence of our
marriage, or which we or either of us may receive by gift, bequest, devise, or
inheritance, and all the proceeds, issues, and profits of any and all such property shall
be treated and considered, and hereby is declared to be received, held, taken, and
owned by us as joint tenants, and not otherwise, with the right of survivorship.

Id.
68. Id. at 113.
69. Id. Due to the tax rate structure in place today, a husband and wife could rarely achieve a
lower aggregate tax by reporting their income separately. See I.R.C. § l(a), (1)(d) (1994)
(requiring married taxpayers who file separately to pay tax at higher rates). In 2001, for married
persons filing jointly and surviving spouses, the tax rates were: 15% of all income under $45,200,
27.5% of all income over $45,200 but less than $109,250, 30.5% of all income over $109,250 but
less than $166,500, 35.5% of all income over $166,500 but less than $297,350, and 39.1% of all
income over $297,350. See I.R.S. Pub. 17, at 272 (2001). By contrast, the tax rates for married
persons filing separately are: 15% of all income under $22,600, 27.5% of all income over
$22,600 but less than $54,625, 30.5% of all income over $54,625 but less than $83,250, 35.5% of
all income over $83,250 but less than $148,675, and 39.1% of all income over $148,675. See id.
70. Earl, 281 U.S. at 113.
71. Id. at 114-15. In 1920 and 1921, the years here involved, Mr. Earl earned $24,839.00 and
$22,946.20, respectively, in wages. See Earl v. Comm'r, 30 F.2d 898, 898 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929).
He and his wife made separate income tax returns for the years stated, each returning one-half of
the above amounts. Id. The Commissioner ruled that the entire amount of the petitioner's
earnings was taxable to him, and no part to his wife, and as a result determined that there was a
deficiency in the tax paid by the petitioner in the sums of $2,420 for 1912, and $2,432 for 1921.
Id.
72. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15 (recognizing the absence of a statutory mandate).
73. Id. (explaining that the "import" of the statute supported the conclusion that income
should be taxed to the person who earned it).
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paying tax on that income.74 This conclusion was based on the Court's
determination that Mr. Earl was the taxpayer who "realized" the income
because he was the only person that could take the last step in the
75
performance of the services leading to the production of that income.
In other words, he had 76exclusive control over whether the income was
earned in the first place.
Notably, in defining the assignment-of-income doctrine, the Court
held that it would not consider the taxpayer's motive behind a
contract.77 For example, in Earl, the Court assumed that a valid
purpose, outside of the avoidance of income tax, existed for Mr. Earl
and his wife to enter into a contract allocating his income between
them. 78 The Court held, using a now famous fruit-tree metaphor, that
regardless of the motive of the taxpayer in creating an assignment, no
anticipatory arrangement attributing income to a different taxpayer than
the one who earns it can serve to shift the tax burden with respect to that
79
income.
2. The Continuing Development of the Doctrine
After Lucas v. Earl, a second Supreme Court case helped shape the
assignment-of-income doctrine. 80 In Helvering v. Horst, the owner of
negotiable bonds detached the interest coupons from the bonds shortly
before their due date and transferred them to his son as a gift.8 ' The son

74. Id. at 115 (stating that tax may "not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts
however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the
man who earned it").
75. Id. at 114.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (stating that "the validity of the contract is not questioned").
79. Id. at 115. Justice Holmes stated that "no distinction can be taken according to the
motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that
on which they grew." Id. The Court likened an income-producing asset to a tree, and compared
the income earned by that asset to the fruit borne of the tree. Id. In this case, the owner of the
"tree" was Mr. Earl, the taxpayer earning income from services, and the "fruit" was the salary he
earned from his efforts. Id. In general, to identify the owner of the "fruit-bearing tree," courts
look to the degree of control possessed by the taxpayer over the asset giving rise to the income.
See James Serven, The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Contingent Legal Fees in Personal
Injury Cases, 30 COLO. LAW. 81, 82 (2001). In the context of attorney's fees, an analogy is made
as to whether the client is the "owner" of the entire cause of action (the tree) so that the entire
recovery (the fruit) is fully taxable to the client irrespective of any amount directed to the attorney
under a contingent fee arrangement. Id.
80. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120 (1940) (holding a donor taxable on interest income
even though he transferred the right to receive the interest payments to his son as a gift).
81. Id. at 114.
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82
collected the interest due on the coupons in the same taxable year.
The Commissioner determined that the interest income from the
83
coupons should be taxed to the donor, rather than to the donor's son.
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that when the donor transferred the
right to receive payments of interest to his son, the donor enjoyed an
economic benefit from the income just as if he would have collected the
interest payments himself and then used the cash to fund the gift to his
84
son.
The Court noted that the taxpayer held two independent and
separable property rights in the bonds. 85 One was the right to demand
and receive at maturity the principal amount of the bond. 86 The other
was the right to demand and receive interim payments of interest on the
investment, which he gave to his son.87 In contrast to the situation in
which a donor makes a gift of income-producing property, 88 the
taxpayer in Horst retained an ownership interest in the underlying
property. 89 As a result, the taxpayer realized income when the interest
was paid on the coupons. 90 The Court made clear that there is no
meaningful distinction between a taxpayer receiving and using his
income to fulfill a desire and him transferring his right to receive that
91
income in order to effectuate the same result.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 120.
85. Id. at 115.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). The plaintiff transferred his beneficial interest in
a testamentary trust to his children. Id. at 6. The Court held that the plaintiff transferred his
entire interest as a life beneficiary of the trust and that he retained no ownership rights after the
transfer. Id. at 13. Accordingly, the Court found that the tax that attached to the ownership of the
specified interest was appropriately imposed on the person to whom it was assigned and not to the
plaintiff. Id. at 12.
89. Horst, 311 U.S. at 118-19.
90. Id. at 120. It is noteworthy that although Horst involved a transfer by gift, the Court also
cited Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner and expressly recognized that a taxpayer can realize
income whether he directs a payment to his creditors or directs payment to the "objects of his
bounty." Id. at 116 (citing Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929)). In Old
Colony Trust, the taxpayer's employer paid the income taxes on his salary directly to the
government. Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 719. The Court held that a taxpayer who induces or
acquiesces to the payment of an obligation by a third party may not avoid the liability for the
corresponding tax. Id. at 729. The Court held that the form of the payment did not affect the tax
consequences to the taxpayer and that it was immaterial that the taxes were paid directly to the
government without first coming into his possession. Id. The Court's conclusion was based on
the concept that the discharge by a third party of an obligation of the taxpayer is equivalent to
receipt of that income by the taxpayer. Id.
91. Horst, 311 U.S. at 117-18.
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In the same year the Supreme Court decided Horst, it decided a third
influential assignment-of-income case. 92 In Helvering v. Eubank, a
former life insurance agent assigned his right to receive renewal
commissions that would become payable to him for services rendered
during his employment. 93 Although Mr. Eubank did not retain an
ownership interest in the renewal commissions, the Court found no
purpose for the assignment other than to confer power on the assignees
to collect the commissions. 94 As a result, the Court, relying on its
reasoning in Horst,95 concluded that Mr. Eubank could not avoid paying
tax on income he earned from services by transferring
the right to
96
receive the income through an anticipatory assignment.
Currently, the assignment-of-income doctrine requires that, for
purposes of taxation, income is attributable to the person entitled to
receive it, even though he assigns his right in advance of receipt. 97 In
the case of income from services, the income is taxed to the individual

The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained the
satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure those
satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the means of procuring
them .... The enjoyment of the economic benefit accruing to him by virtue of his
acquisition of the coupons is realized to him as completely as it would have been if he
had collected the interest in dollars and expended them .... To say that one who has
made a gift thus derived from interest or earnings paid to his donee has never enjoyed
or realized the fruits of his investment or labor because he has assigned them instead of
collecting them himself and then paying them over to the donee, is to affront common
understanding and to deny the facts of common experience. Common understanding
and experience are the touchstones for the interpretation of the revenue laws.
Id.
92. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
93. Id. at 124. During part of the year 1924, Eubank was employed as a branch manager by
Canada Life Assurance Company and received, as part of his compensation, commissions on
agency contracts written by him. Eubank v. Comm'r, 110 F.2d 737, 738 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 311
U.S. 122 (1940). Under the terms of his employment contract, he was entitled to renewal
commissions on premiums collected by Canada Life on policies written prior to the termination
of his agency, without obligation to provide further services. Id. From September 1, 1924 to
August 31, 1927, Eubank was a general agent for the Aetna Life Assurance Company. Id. His
contract with Aetna similarly entitled him to renewal premiums paid after the termination of his
agency, without the performance of further services. id. In 1928, Eubank made assignments to a
corporate trustee of the renewal commissions that were to become payable to him for services he
performed under these separate agency contracts. Id.
94. Eubank, 311 U.S. at 124.
95. Horst, 311 U.S. at 112.
96. Eubank, 311 U.S. at 125 (stating that "for the reasons stated at length in the Horst case,"
the commissions were taxable to Mr. Eubank).
97. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 420 (1994) (Chabot, J., dissenting) [hereinafter
Kenseth 1], aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
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who renders the services. 98 In the case of income from property, the
99
income is taxed to the individual who beneficially owns the property.
In the context of contingent attorney's fees, courts apply the
assignment-of-income doctrine to tax a client on the portion of a
judgment or settlement recovered by the client that is paid directly to his
attorney under a contingent fee contract. 1°° These courts reason that the
client receives a benefit by way of a discharge of the otherwise existing
obligation to pay legal fees. 10 ' Courts requiring taxpayers to include the
attorney's fees paid from the recovery also allow the taxpayer a
corresponding deduction for the legal expenses incurred in obtaining the
award. 102
D. The Deduction Dilemma
While the assignment-of-income doctrine limits the anticipatory
assignment of taxable income, a taxpayer is generally entitled to
statutory deductions for expenses incurred in the production of taxable
income. 10 3 Although a taxpayer who operates a trade or business" °
98. Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5, 11-12 (1937).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a taxpayer
must include contingent attorney's fees in gross income under the assignment-of-income
doctrine); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the
assignment of a portion of a lawsuit recovery to an attorney constitutes gross income to the client
even though the client never actually received the funds); see also infra Part III.B (analyzing the
rationale of courts holding that contingent attorney' s fees are includable in gross income).
101. See, e.g., Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the client's discharge of an obligation to pay legal fees owed by her was a benefit to the client
within the definition of gross income); Kenseth II, 259 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
a taxpayer could not shift his tax liability by assigning a portion of his income to a law firm).
102. See, e.g., Campbell, 274 F.3d at 1314 (holding that the taxpayer's judgment was a
recovery of gross income and the attorney's fees she paid were expenses incurred in generating
that income); Kenseth H, 259 F.3d at 883 (holding that the fees paid to the taxpayer's attorney
were a deduction from, not a reduction of gross income); see also infra Part II.D-E (discussing
the deduction provisions applicable to contingent attorney's fees).
103. See Kenseth I, 114 T.C. 399, 417 (2000) (holding that contingent legal fees were
deductible expenses subject to applicable statutory limitations), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir.
2001); see also I.R.C. § 162 (1994) (providing a deduction for ordinary and necessary business
expenses); I.R.C. § 212 (1994) (allowing a deduction for expenses incurred in the production of
income).
104. Despite the prevalent use of the tax concept of a "trade or business," the Internal
Revenue Code has never defined the words for widespread application. Comm'r v. Groetzinger,
480 U.S. 23, 27 (1987). Therefore, courts have established a series of objective factors to be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis that support a finding that a taxpayer is engaged in a trade or
business. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972). These factors include, the manner in which the
taxpayer conducts the activity, the expertise of the taxpayer or advisors, the time and effort the
taxpayer expends in conducting the activity, the intention to generate a profit, the taxpayer's
success in conducting similar activities, the taxpayer's history of profits and losses with respect to
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may take a business deduction for legal fees, such fees typically fall
under the category of miscellaneous itemized deductions.' 015 The
Internal Revenue Code, however, places significant limitations on
miscellaneous itemized deductions which can dramatically increase the
06
tax burden for unsuspecting taxpayers. 1
1. The Deduction for Legal Expenses
In general, when a taxpayer generates gross income at a cost, the
amount of the income is not affected. 0 7 Rather, the taxpayer may be
entitled to a deduction that offsets the income realized from his
efforts.' 0 8 If for some reason the cost of generating the income is not
deductible, however, the taxpayer is not permitted to net his gross
income and expenses. 10 9 Instead, the taxpayer must report his income
in full without regard to the costs incurred to obtain it. 110
With respect to legal fees, two Code provisions govern whether a
taxpayer is allowed to take a deduction.'
First, if the taxpayer is
engaged in a trade or business, he may deduct legal fees under § 162,
which allows a deduction for all business expenses that are ordinary and
necessary to the conduct of the business.11 2 If a taxpayer is not engaged
the activity, the amount of any profits earned, the taxpayer's financial status, and the extent to
which personal pleasure or recreation is involved in the activity. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1832(b)(1)-(b)(9) (1972).
105. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing the character of deductions
under the Code). Miscellaneous itemized deductions are itemized deductions other than those
deductions specifically enumerated in I.R.C. §§ 67(b)(1)-(12). I.R.C. § 67(b) (1994).
106. See infra notes 119-35 and accompanying text (examining the Internal Revenue Code
limitations on miscellaneous itemized deductions).
107. See Kenseth 1I, 259 F.3d at 883 (explaining that taxable income is gross income minus
allowable deductions). For example, if a firm pays a salesman on a commission basis for his
services, the sales income he generates is income to the firm and any commissions paid to him are
a deductible expense. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 161 (1994) (providing that only certain expenses are deductible
for income tax purposes). Section 161 states that "[in computing taxable income under section
63, there shall be allowed as deductions the items specified in this part, subject to" certain
exceptions. I.R.C. § 161.
110. See Kenseth 11, 259 F.3d at 883.
111. See I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 212 (1994). There is also a third option for legal fees which is less
common. See I.R.C. § 263 (1994). Section 263 requires a taxpayer to capitalize, and not
currently deduct, legal fees associated with the acquisition of a capital asset or a business. Id.; see
CHRISTOPHER G. STONEMAN, DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING FEES, BRIBES AND
ILLEGAL PAYMENTS, TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO NO. 523-2ND, A-14 (2000) (providing a
detailed discussion regarding the deductibility of legal fees).
112. I.R.C. § 162(a). Section 162 states that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business." I.R.C. § 162(a). "Necessary" expenses are those that are "appropriate and helpful"
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in a trade or business, the more common situation in which contingent
fee contracts are used, the taxpayer may instead be able to deduct the
legal fees under § 212.113 To qualify under § 212, the legal fees must be
ordinary and4 necessary expenses and must be incurred in the production
of income. t
2. The Importance of Characterizing the Legal Expense Deduction
The distinction between ordinary and necessary business expenses
under § 162 and expenses incurred in connection with the production of
income under § 212 is significant with respect to contingent legal
fees. 115 A taxpayer who can deduct legal fees under § 162 takes his
to the carrying on of one's business. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933) (holding that
payments to creditors were "necessary" in the sense that they were "appropriate and helpful").
"Ordinary" expenses are those that are common within the business community to which the
taxpayer belongs. Id. at 114. Under Welch, legal fees qualify as "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses. Id.
113. See I.R.C. § 212, which states:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of, property held for the
production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.
Id.
The purpose of enacting § 212 was to prevent a person receiving income from being charged
with his gross receipts without being allowed to set off expenses without which those receipts
would not have come to hand at all. Comm'r v. Heide, 165 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1948).
114. I.R.C. § 212(1). In order for an expense to be deductible under § 212, it must be
"ordinary and necessary." Welch, 290 U.S. at 113. Thus, the expense "must be reasonable in
amount and must bear a reasonable and proximate relation to the production or collection of
taxable income or to the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income." Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(d) (1975). An expense for legal fees paid in the
pursuit of a taxable lawsuit recovery qualifies as an expense related to the production or
collection of taxable income under § 212. See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(a)(1) (1975) (allowing a
deduction under § 212 for expenses incurred in producing or collecting income that will be
subject to federal tax).
115. Robert W. Wood, Settlement: The Tax Issues, 2001 CURRENT DEV. EMP. L.: JULY 26-28,
1145, 1158 (ALI-ABA). The determination of whether legal fees are deductible under § 162 or §
212 is made based on the "origin of the claim test." See Arthur H. DuGrenier, Inc. v. Comm'r, 58
T.C. 931 (1972). The "origin of the claim test" was first applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1941 in Hort v. Commissioner and later defined in United States v. Gilmore. United States v.
Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1962); Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). The object of the "origin of
the claim test" is to find the transaction or activity from which the taxable event approximately
resulted, or the event that led to the tax dispute. See Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49.
In Hort, the taxpayer acquired real estate by devise that was subject to a lease. Hort, 313 U.S.
at 29. A few years later, the taxpayer agreed to cancel the lease in exchange for a lump some
payment of $140,000 from the lessee. Id. The taxpayer reported a loss on his tax return to reflect
the difference between the present value of the unmatured rental payments and the fair rental
value of the property for the unexpired term of the lease. Id. The IRS disallowed this loss and
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deductions "above-the-line" as a direct reduction to gross income. 116 In
contrast, § 212 deductions are "below-the-line" deductions, or

included the $140,000 payment in the taxpayer's gross income. Id. The Supreme Court agreed
with the IRS, reasoning that any proceeds of a suit to recover damages if the lessee breached the
lease contract would have been included in gross income. Id. at 30-31. The Court held that the
$140,000 payment received by the taxpayer was essentially a substitute for rent payments due
under the lease, and thus ordinary income. Id. at 30.
In Gilmore, the taxpayer's wife filed for divorce and asserted a claim against the taxpayer's
stock interests in three corporations, arguing that they were community property. Gilmore, 372
U.S. at 41. The taxpayer incurred legal fees associated with a claim he initiated to allegedly
defend his stock interests. Id. The taxpayer deducted these legal fees as § 212 expenses incurred
for the conservation of property. Id. The Commissioner disallowed these deductions, classifying
them as non-deductible personal or family expenses. Id. at 42. The Supreme Court, agreeing
with the IRS, held that the character of the claim, rather than its potential consequences, was the
controlling test of whether an expense was business or personal. Id. at 49. In this case, the Court
determined that the claim stemmed from the marital relationship, and thus, the taxpayer's legal
fees were personal expenses which were not deductible. Id. at 52.
116. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (1994). Above-the-line deductions are those expenses that are
subtracted from a taxpayer's income before arriving at adjusted gross income. Id. Section 62
enumerates seventeen types of deductions which qualify for "above-the-line" treatment as
follows:
(a) General rule.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "adjusted gross income"
means, in the case of an individual, gross income minus the following deductions:
(1) Trade and business deductions.-The deductions allowed by this chapter
(other than by part VII of this subchapter) which are attributable to a trade or
business carried on by the taxpayer, if such trade or business does not consist of
the performance of services by the taxpayer as an employee.
(2) Certain trade and business deductions of employees.(A) Reimbursed expenses of employees.-The deductions allowed by part
VI (section 161 and following) which consist of expenses paid or incurred
by the taxpayer, in connection with the performance by him of services as an
employee, under a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement
with his employer. The fact that the reimbursement may be provided by a
third party shall not be determinative of whether or not the preceding
sentence applies.
(B) Certain expenses of performing artists.-The deductions allowed by
section 162 which consist of expenses paid or incurred by a qualified
performing artist in connection with the performances by him of services in
the performing arts as an employee.
(C) Certain expenses of officials.-The deductions allowed by section 162
which consist of expenses paid or incurred with respect to services
performed by an official as an employee of a State or a political subdivision
thereof in a position compensated in whole or in part on a fee basis.
(3) Losses from sale or exchange of property.-The deductions allowed by part
VI (sec. 161 and following) as losses from the sale or exchange of property.
(4) Deductions attributable to rents and royalties.-The deductions allowed by
part VI (sec. 161 and following), by section 212 (relating to expenses for
production of income), and by section 611 (relating to depletion) which are
attributable to property held for the production of rents or royalties.
(5) Certain deductions of life tenants and income beneficiaries of property.-In
the case of a life tenant of property, or an income beneficiary of property held in

2002]

The Fruit Does Not Fall Far From the Tree

1009

miscellaneous itemized deductions,"17 which do not directly reduce
gross income. 118
trust, or an heir, legatee, or devisee of an estate, the deduction for depreciation
allowed by section 167 and the deduction allowed by section 611.
(6) Pension, profit-sharing, and annuity plans of self-employed individuals.-In
the case of an individual who is an employee within the meaning of section
401(c)(1), the deduction allowed by section 404.
(7) Retirement savings.-The deduction allowed by section 219 (relating to
deduction of certain retirement savings).
[(8) Repealed. Pub. L. 104-188, Title I, § 1401(b)(4), Aug. 20, 1996, 110 Stat.
1788]
(9) Penalties forfeited because of premature withdrawal of funds from time
savings accounts or deposits.-The deductions allowed by section 165 for losses
incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a
trade or business to the extent that such losses include amounts forfeited to a
bank, mutual savings bank, savings and loan association, building and loan
association, cooperative bank or homestead association as a penalty for premature
withdrawal of funds from a time savings account, certificate of deposit. or similar
class of deposit.
(10) Alimony.-The deduction allowed by section 215.
(11) Reforestation expenses.-The deduction allowed by section 194.
(12) Certain required repayments of supplemental unemployment compensation
benefits.-The deduction allowed by section 165 for the repayment to a trust
described in paragraph (9) or (17) of section 501(c) of supplemental
unemployment compensation benefits received from such trust if such repayment
is required because of the receipt of trade readjustment allowances under section
231 or 232 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2291 and 2292).
(13) Jury duty pay remitted to employer.-Any deduction allowable under this
chapter by reason of an individual remitting any portion of any jury pay to such
individual's employer in exchange for payment by the employer of compensation
for the period such individual was performing jury duty. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, the term "jury pay" means any payment received by the
individual for the discharge of jury duty.
(14) Deduction for clean-fuel vehicles and certain refueling property.-The
deduction allowed by section 179A.
(15) Moving expenses.-The deduction allowed by section 217.
(16) Archer MSAs.-The deduction allowed by section 220.
(17) Interest on education loans.-The deduction allowed by section 221.
(18) Higher education expenses.-The deduction allowed by section 222.
I.R.C. § 62 (1994).
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-IT (2000). Below-the-line deductions are those expenses that are
subtracted, subject to statutory limitations, from the adjusted gross income of the taxpayer to
arrive at taxable income. See id. (describing some deductions that fall into the category of belowthe-line deductions). The term "miscellaneous itemized deductions" describes "the deductions
allowable from adjusted gross income in determining taxable income," with certain exceptions.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.67-IT(b). Section 67(b) describes miscellaneous itemized deductions as
itemized deductions other than those deductions specifically enumerated in § 67(b)(1) through
(12) as follows:
For purposes of this section, the term "miscellaneous itemized deductions" means the
itemized deductions other than(1) the deduction under section 163 (relating to interest),
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The categorization of deductions plays an important role for
individual taxpayers because miscellaneous itemized deductions carry
with them several statutory disadvantages. 1 9 First, miscellaneous
itemized deductions are deductible only to the extent that the aggregate
amount of those deductions exceeds two percent of adjusted gross
income. 120 Second, otherwise allowable miscellaneous itemized
deductions are subject to a phase-out calculation that affects most
itemized deductions. 12 1 This phase-out calculation requires a taxpayer,
(2) the deduction under section 164 (relating to taxes),
(3) the deduction under section 165(a) for casualty or theft losses described in
paragraph (2) or (3) of section 165(c) or for losses described in section 165(d),
(4) the deductions under section 170 (relating to charitable, etc., contributions and
gifts) and section 642(c) (relating to deduction for amounts paid or permanently
set aside for a charitable purpose),
(5) the deduction under section 213 (relating to medical, dental, etc., expenses),
(6) any deduction allowable for impairment-related work expenses,
(7) the deduction under section 69 1(c) (relating to deduction for estate tax in case
of income in respect of the decedent),
(8) any deduction allowable in connection with personal property used in a short
sale,
(9) the deduction under section 1341 (relating to computation of tax where
taxpayer restores substantial amount held under claim of right),
(10) the deduction under section 72(b)(3) (relating to deduction where annuity
payments cease before investment recovered),
(11) the deduction under section 171 (relating to deduction for amortizable bond
premium), and
(12) the deduction under section 216 (relating to deductions in connection with
cooperative housing corporations),
(13) Redesignated (12).
I.R.C. § 67(b) (1994). Itemized deductions are deductions other than § 151 personal exemptions
and § 62 "above-the-line" deductions. I.R.C. § 63 (1994). Under § 151, a taxpayer receives a
deduction each year in the form of a personal exemption for himself, his spouse, and any
qualified dependants. I.R.C. § 151 (b) (1994). Miscellaneous itemized deductions may be subject
to significant limitations under the Code. See I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 68(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1) (1994).
118. See I.R.C. § 63(d) (1994) (defining taxable income as adjusted gross income less § 67
deductions and § 151 personal exemptions).
119. See infra notes 120-35 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations imposed on
miscellaneous itemized deductions for purposes of the regular federal income tax and the
alternative minimum tax).
120. I.R.C. § 67(a). Adjusted gross income is calculated by reducing the gross income of a
taxpayer by all § 62 deductions. I.R.C. § 62; see also supra note 116 (detailing the allowable §
62 deductions for arriving at adjusted gross income). For example, if a taxpayer had $50,000 in
wages and paid alimony of $15,000 in a given tax year, the taxpayer's adjusted gross income
would be $35,000. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(10) (allowing an above the line deduction for qualified
alimony payments).
121. See I.R.C. §§ 68(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(l). There are currently three types of nonmiscellaneous itemized deductions that are not subject to the phase-out calculation. See I.R.C. §
68(c) (1994). The exceptions relate to deductions for medical expenses, investment interest, and
casualty and theft losses. Id.
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whose adjusted gross income exceeds a specified amount, to reduce the
122
amount of his itemized deductions by three percent of the excess.
Although these limitations alone can be significant in a given taxable
year, the treatment of miscellaneous itemized deductions is subject123to
even harsher rules for taxpayers under the Alternative Minimum Tax.
E. The Alternative Minimum Tax Trap
Even more onerous than the limitations on deductions for legal fees
for regular tax purposes is the treatment of such expenses under the
Alternative Minimum Tax ("AMT"). 124 Congress first created the AMT
in 1969 as an add-on tax, exacted in addition to the regular tax. 125 The
overall objective in designing the AMT was to ensure that no taxpayer
with substantial income could avoid tax liability through the use of
excessive deductions or credits. 126 Congress believed that the favored
tax status afforded certain types of income and expenses allowed

122. Id. Section 68 reduces the total of all itemized deductions by the lesser of three percent
of the amount by which adjusted gross income exceeds $100,000, or 80% of otherwise allowable
itemized deductions. I.R.C. § 68(b)(2). The $100,000 threshold is adjusted annually for
inflation. Id. For 2001, the inflation-adjusted threshold is $132,950. See I.R.S. Pub. 17, at 144
(2001). For example, if a taxpayer has AGI of $350,000 and allowable itemized deductions of
$110,000, the itemized deduction phase-out would be $65,115 calculated as follows:
$350,000 (AGI) - $132,950 (2001 threshold)=$217,050
$217,050x3% = $65,115
Compare 80% x $110,000 (otherwise allowable itemized deductions) = $88,000
Since $65,115 is less than $88,000, the phase-out amount is $65,115.
123. See infra Part II.E (examining the applicable deduction rules under the AMT).
124. See I.R.C. §§ 55-58 (1994). Section 55 requires every taxpayer to compute the AMT
each year based on the taxpayer's alternative minimum taxable income ("AMTI"). I.R.C. § 55(a).
AMTI is equal to the taxpayer's taxable income as reported for regular tax purposes with various
statutory adjustments. I.R.C. § 55(b)(2). The AMT is then calculated by applying two rate
brackets, 26% and 28%, to the amount of the taxpayers AMTI that exceeds a fixed exemption
amount. I.R.C. §§ 55(b)(l)(A)(i)(I)-(II). For 2001, the exemption amounts are $49,000 for
married taxpayers filing a joint tax return, and $35,750 for unmarried taxpayers and surviving
spouses. I.R.C. § 55(d)(1). In a given year, if a taxpayer's minimum tax exceeds his regular tax
liability, the higher amount must be paid. I.R.C. § 55(a).
125. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301(a), 83 Stat. 487 (codified at
I.R.C. §§ 56-58). Since 1969, Congress restructured the AMT at various time through
amendments. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301, 90 Stat. 1520, 1549-54. Under current law, the
AMT is not an "add-on tax," but rather an alternative tax that must be paid whenever an
individual's AMT liability exceeds his regular tax liability. See I.R.C. § 55(a); see also supra
note 124 (detailing the computation of the AMT).
126. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, 105 (Comm. Print 1970) (explaining the purpose of the first add-on
minimum tax as providing "a minimum tax on specified tax preference income received by
individuals and corporations in order to make sure that all taxpayers are required to pay
significant amounts of tax on their economic income").
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taxpayers to undermine the progressive rate structure and unfairly
allocate the income tax burden. 127 Congress was also concerned that
the effect of excessive tax avoidance by some taxpayers could lead to a
128
breakdown of morale that would complicate tax collection.
The most significant aspect of the AMT with regard to the issue of
contingent attorney's fees is its disallowance of miscellaneous itemized
deductions. 129
Congress did not explain this limitation, but
commentators suggest that the AMT restricts the deduction for
contingent attorney's fees in order to accomplish the same objective as
the deduction limitations present under the regular tax. 130 That is, to
prevent a taxpayer from deducting expenses that are personal in
nature. 131
The disallowance of miscellaneous itemized deductions effectively
creates a larger tax base upon which the AMT is calculated. 132 If a
taxpayer is required to include his contingent legal fees in gross income
but cannot deduct them for AMT purposes, the AMT will almost
certainly exceed the regular tax for the year, triggering additional tax
liability. 133 Not only does the applicability of the AMT take many
taxpayers by surprise, but the amount of additional tax imposed can be
substantial. 134 The United States Tax Court examined the tax treatment
35
of contingent attorney's fees with consistent results. 1
127. See id.
128. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 2040 (1969).
129. I.R.C. § 56(b)(l)(A)(i).
(b) Adjustments applicable to individuals.-In determining the amount of the
alternative minimum taxable income of any taxpayer (other than a corporation), the
following treatment shall apply (in lieu of the treatment applicable for purposes of
computing the regular tax):
(1)Limitation on deductions.(A) In general.-No deduction shall be allowed(i) for any miscellaneous itemized deduction (as defined in section
67(b)).
Id.
130. See Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines Civil Rights Law,
73 S.CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1092 (2000).
131. Id. Professors Sager and Cohen suggest that Congress' motive in restricting AMT
deductions was "to prevent the deduction of 'expenses [that] have characteristics of voluntary
personal consumption expenditures."' Id. (quoting STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 100TH
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 78-79 (Comm. Print 1987)).
132. See I.R.C. § 55(b)(2) (1994).
133. See id. (explaining that because the tentative minimum tax factors in the exclusion for
miscellaneous itemized deductions, the tentative minimum tax will likely exceed the regular tax
for taxpayers with significant legal fees in a given tax year).
134. See Sheridan, supra note 17, at 312; Sager & Cohen, supra note 130, at 1078 (stating that
"[i]f the ratio of attorney's fees to the entire recovery is high enough, a before-tax gain may
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F. The Tax Court's View Regarding the Taxation of
ContingentAttorney's Fees
With one exception, 136 the Tax Court has consistently held that a
taxpayer's entire recovery, including the portion used to pay his
contingent attorney's fees, is fully includible in the taxpayer's gross
income. 137 Although the Tax Court has reached this conclusion on

metamorphose into an after-tax loss"). Because of the exclusion of miscellaneous itemized
deductions under the AMT, it is possible for the attorney's fees and tax burden to consume most
or all of the recovery received by the client. Sheridan, supra note 17, at 312. For example, in
Alexander v. IRS, the plaintiff received a settlement of $350,000 in a suit for breach of contract
and age discrimination which was includible in gross income. Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938,
940 (lst Cir. 1995). He paid legal fees of $258,000 out of this settlement which were allowed as
a miscellaneous itemized deduction. Id. Presuming that the AMT rate on the $350,000 recovery
was twenty-eight percent, the plaintiff paid $98,000 in taxes on his recovery. See Sheridan, supra
note 17, at 312. Adding the tax to the total legal fees paid, the taxpayer paid $356,000 in order to
receive a $350,000 settlement. Id.
135. See infra Part II.F (discussing the reasoning of the Tax Court with regard to contingent
attorney's fees).
136. Davis v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 46, aff'd, 210 F.3d 1346 (11 th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam). In Davis, the Tax Court ruled that it was bound to allow the exclusion of attorney fees
under Fifth Circuit precedent because it was binding on the Eleventh Circuit to which Davis was
appealable. Id. at 48; see also Bonner v. City of Prichard. 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981)
(en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the "old Fifth" Circuit handed
down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).
The only time the Tax Court held that contingent attorney's fees could be excluded from gross
income, it did so under the Golsen rule. See Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970),
aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). The Golsen rule requires that the Tax Court defer to the law
of the United States Courts of Appeals to which a particular case is appealable. id. The plaintiff
in Golsen purchased life insurance for himself and his family using a device whereby he paid
little or no after-tax cost for the premiums. Id. at 752. The device was based on a specially
designed insurance policy that allowed borrowing of the annual increase in the cash value of the
policy at four percent interest. Id. The net result of this scheme was that the insured's net out-ofpocket cost of the insurance would be equal to the true actuarial cost of the insurance benefits. Id.
The success of this device required that a deduction for the interest paid on the loans would be
allowed. Id. The Commissioner contended that the "loan" feature of the scheme lacked
substance and challenged the interest deductions. Id. at 752-53. The court, in finding for the
Commissioner on the merits, concluded that its holding was mandated by a prior case decided by
the Court of Appeals for the same circuit within which Golsen arose. Id. at 756-57. The Tax
Court stated:
[I]t is our best judgment that better judicial administration requires us to follow a Court
of Appeals decision which is squarely in [sic] point where appeal from our decision
lies to that Court of Appeals and to that court alone.
Id. at 757 (footnote omitted).
137. See, e.g., Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2122, 2126 (2000) (relying
"on the well-established assignment of income doctrine" to reject the contention that taxpayers
may exclude contingent attorney's fees from their gross income), aff'd sub nom Campbell v.
Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir 2001); Petersen v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 137, 152 (1962) (stating
that "[it is our conclusion that the awards, undiminished by the attorney's fees, constituted
taxable income to the petitioners under the principle of Lucas v. Earl .... ).
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many occasions, the rationale for its position was most fully presented
13 8
in the recent case of Kenseth v. Commissioner ("Kenseth F').
In Kenseth I, Eldon Kenseth was terminated by his employer after
twenty-one years of service.1 39 As a result of his termination, Mr.
Kenseth joined a class action suit against his former employer under the
1967 Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 140 Each member
of the class entered into an identical contingent fee agreement with a

138. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. 399 (2000), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). Kenseth I was a
fully reviewed decision. Id. at 417. A reviewed case is one in which all thirteen Tax Court
judges participate in the decision. See Wood, supra note 115, at 1161. Normally, decisions are
made by only one judge. Id. In Kenseth 1, eight Tax Court judges were in the majority and five
judges dissented. See Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 417, 421. The dissent in Kenseth 1 focused on the
inapplicability of the assignment-of-income doctrine to contingent fee agreements. Id. at 441
(Beghe, J., dissenting). Judge Beghe reasoned that when a taxpayer enters a contingent fee
agreement, he relinquishes meaningful control over the outcome of his suit. Id. at 443-44 (Beghe,
J., dissenting). Judge Beghe argued further that the result in Kenseth I was unfair to the taxpayer
and that the court should act to remedy the unfairness in the absence of Congressional or Supreme
Court intervention. See id. at 426 (Beghe, J., dissenting). The split on the Tax Court with respect
to contingent attorney fees indicates the magnitude of the problem facing taxpayers and signals an
urgent need for resolution by Congress or the Supreme Court. See Robert W. Wood, Even Tax
Court Itself Divided on Attorneys' Fees Issue!, 88 TAx NOTES 573, 576 (2000).
The United States Court of Federal Claims and the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama also heard cases on this issue, and acknowledged their support for the Tax
Court's reasoning. See, e.g., Foster v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1238 (N.D. Ala.
2000) (allowing, reluctantly, exclusion of contingent attorney's fees based on binding precedent
within the jurisdiction but agreeing with the Tax Court's reasoning on the issue), affid in part,
249 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2001); Baylin v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 248, 259 (Fed. Cl. 1993)
(requiring the inclusion of contingent attorneys fees), aff'd, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see
also infra note 164 (discussing the facts and holding of both Baylin and Foster).
139. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 400. Prior to his termination, Mr. Kenseth was a forty-five year
old master scheduler for APV Crepaco (APV) with twenty-one years seniority. Id. In 1991, APV
terminated Mr. Kenseth along with sixteen other employees over the age of forty. Id. At the
same time, APV did not terminate younger employees occupying the same position with the
company. Id. Mr. Kenseth, along with the other sixteen former employees of APV, hired the law
firm of Fox & Fox, S.C. to represent them in a class action suit against APV for violation of the
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Id. The relevant portion of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
140. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 400, 403.
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law firm, which included a clause outlining14 1the fee arrangement in the
event of a settlement or favorable judgment.
The plaintiffs eventually resolved their dispute and executed a
settlement agreement for $2,650,000 to be apportioned among the
plaintiffs and their attorneys pursuant to the contingent fee
agreements. 142 Mr. Kenseth's share of the gross settlement totaled
$230,000. 143 The settlement agreement divided the recovery into lost
wages and personal injury damages. 144 Mr. Kenseth appropriately
included $32,000, the amount of his recovery attributable to lost wages,
in gross income on his federal income tax return. 145 The remaining
$198,000 of his recovery was not reported in gross income on the basis
of the settlement agreement, which designated those damages as
excludable under § 104(a)(2)
of the Internal Revenue Code as damages
146
for personal injuries.
After a review of Mr. and Mrs. Kenseths' joint federal tax return, the
Internal Revenue Service issued a notice of deficiency increasing the
Kenseths' gross income by $198,000.147 The IRS notice allowed a
$91,800 itemized deduction for legal fees paid in connection with the

141. Id. at 400-02 (discussing the terms of the contingent fee contract). The contingent fee
agreement provided that the attorney would "have a lien against any damages, proceeds, costs and
fees recovered in the client's action for the fees and costs due the attorney under" the contract.
Id. at 402.
142. Id. at 404.
143. Id. The exact amount retained by the taxpayer was $229,501.37. Id.
144. Id. at 404-05.
145. Id. at 405. The actual amount included in gross income was $32,476.61. Id. Prior to
issuing Mr. Kenseth a check, APV withheld federal and state employment taxes of $11,230.41 on
the lost wages portion of the settlement. Id. at 404. The net amount of the check to Mr. Kenseth
was $21,246.20. Id.
146. Id. at 404-05. The exact amount the settlement agreement purported to exclude was
$197,024.76. Id. at 405. Prior to its amendment in 1996, § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code exempted from gross income "the amount of any damages received on account of personal
injuries .... " I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994 & West Supp. 2001). The applicable Treasury
Regulations clarified that the damages excludable under § 104(a)(2) were those received through
"prosecution of a legal suit or action based on tort or tort type rights." Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)
(1970). Although the status of damages based on a discrimination suit was unclear at the time
that Mr. Kenseth filed his 1993 tax return, Congress modified the statute in 1996 and limited the
exclusion to damages for "physical injuries or physical sickness." I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). As a result
of this revision, the damages recovered by Mr. Kenseth were explicitly excluded from § 104(a)(2)
and thus includible in his gross income. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 406-07.
147. Kenseth I, 114 T.C. at 405-06. The IRS increased the Kenseths' gross income to
$229,501 calculated by adding the $197,024 in income that was inappropriately excluded under §
104(a)(2) to the original $32,477 reported. Id.
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IRS adjustments
taxable damages recovered. 148 The effect of the
149
resulted in a net deficiency of $55,037 in federal tax.
The Kenseths objected to the validity of the additional tax liability
and filed suit in the Tax Court against the Commissioner. 150 They
challenged the inclusion of the settlement portion paid directly to Mr.
Kenseth's attorneys under the contingent fee agreement."' The Tax
Court agreed with the IRS, concluding that the entire recovery,
including the amount paid to the attorneys, constituted gross income and
fees could be deducted subject to any
that the amount paid in legal 52
applicable statutory limitations. 1
In Kenseth I, the Tax Court held that when a taxpayer remits a
portion of a judgment or settlement to his attorney under a contingent
fee arrangement, the taxpayer receives the full benefit of those funds in
the form of payment for the legal services required in obtaining the
award. 153 The Tax Court held that the assignment-of-income doctrine
requires the taxpayer to include the full amount of the award in gross
income despite the fact that he does not actually receive the portion of
the award used to pay the his attorney's fees. 154 The Tax Court
explicitly stated that its conclusion rested entirely on assignment of
granted
income principles, and not on the effect of any state law rights
55
to attorneys with respect to awards obtained for their clients. 1

148. Id. at 405; see also I.R.C. § 212 (1994) (allowing a deduction for expenses incurred in
the production of taxable income). The $91,800 in legal fees was reduced by the two percent
floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions and by $4,694 for the overall limitation on itemized
deductions. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 405-06.; see also I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 68(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1)
(1994) (providing limitations on itemized deductions).
149. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 406.
150. Id. at 400.
151. Id. at 406-07.
152. Id. at 417; see also I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 68(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1); see supra notes 119-35 and
accompanying text (discussing the limitations imposed on miscellaneous itemized deductions for
purposes of the regular federal income tax and the alternative minimum tax).
153. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 413. The IRS explicitly recognized only one exception to this
rule. See Rev. Rul. 80-364, 1980-2 C.B. 294. Where a taxpayer's attorney is paid out of a
judgment where the attorneys' fees are actually expenses of another party, the taxpayer does not
have to include in gross income the attorneys' fees paid out of the award. Id. at 295. This would
occur, for example, where a taxpayer was a member of a union and the attorneys' fees were
expenses of the union, and not the taxpayer/union member who received the award. Id.
154. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 413-15. The court cited the landmark case Lucas v Earl in support
of its application of the assignment-of-income doctrine. Id. at 414 (citing Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111 (1930)); see also supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text (discussing Lucas v. Earl).
155. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 413-16. The state law rights referred to by the Tax Court were
those granted by applicable state attorney lien statutes. Id. at 415. The Tax Court's view with
regard to the relevance of state law was also endorsed in Young v. Commission by the Fourth
Circuit. Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2001). The court in Young explicitly
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In contrast, early decisions by the Tax Court indicated that state law
rights granted in attorney's lien statutes' 56 are relevant in determining
the tax treatment of contingent attorney's fees.' 57 However, the
development of case law in this area led the Tax Court to reject this
proposition and base its holding solely on the assignment-of-income
doctrine supported by the plain language of the Internal Revenue
Code. 158 The court stated that it had long viewed taxable lawsuit

rejected an analysis based on state law and held that the taxation of attorney's fees under a
contingent fee contract should be resolved "by proper federal income tax law, not the amount of
control state law grants to an attorney over the client's cause of action." Id.; see infra note 156
(discussing the application of state attorney lien statutes).
156. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (illustrating the Alabama
attorney's lien statute). An attorney's lien statute is a state law concept allowing an attorney, who
provides legal services on behalf of a client, to obtain a security interest in any judgment or
settlement that results from the client's claim. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 6323(b)(8) (1994) (giving
attorney's liens priority status if the legal services result in a recovery of amounts payable to the
taxpayer). Section 6323(b)(8) states:
Attorneys' liens.-With respect to a judgment or other amount in settlement of a claim
or of a cause of action, as against an attorney who, under local law, holds a lien upon
or a contract enforceable against such judgment or amount, to the extent of his
reasonable compensation for obtaining such judgment or procuring such settlement,
except that this paragraph shall not apply to any judgment or amount in settlement of a
claim or of a cause of action against the United States to the extent that the United
States offsets such judgment or amount against any liability of the taxpayer to the
United States.
I.R.C. § 6323(b)(8).
157. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 412. In Cotnam v. Commissioner, the seminal case setting forth
the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits' positions, the Fifth Circuit relied in part on a then
applicable Alabama attorney's lien statute that gave attorneys the same rights as their clients over
recoveries obtained. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d 119. As a result of the Fifth Circuit's analysis in
Cotnam, the Tax Court examined relevant state law to determine the rights granted to attorneys
when it heard similar cases. See, e.g., Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2122,
2126-27 (2000) (applying Missouri law), aff'd sub nom. Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312
(10th Cir. 2001); Sinyard v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 654, 658 (1998) (applying Arizona law),
aff'd, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 638, 643 (1998)
(applying Texas law), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000); Coady v.
Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 257, 258-59 (1998) (applying Alaska law), aff'd, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th
Cir. 2000); Estate of Gadlow v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 975, 979-80 (1968) (applying Pennsylvania
law); Petersen v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 137, 151-52 (1962) (applying Nebraska and South Dakota
law). Despite a review of state law, the Tax Court held in all of these cases that the taxpayers
were required to include the fee portion of their recoveries in gross income, relying principally on
the assignment-of-income doctrine. See Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 411-12. Further, in O'Brien v.
Commissioner, the Tax Court held that "'even if the taxpayer had made an irrevocable assignment
of a portion of his future recovery to his attorney to such an extent that he never thereafter
became entitled thereto even for a split second, it would still be gross income to him under'
assignment of income principles." See id. (quoting O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707, 712 (1962),
aff'd per curiam, 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963)).
158. See, e.g., Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 412 (rejecting the significance of state attorney's lien
statutes); Sinyard, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 658 (holding that an attorney does not have equitable
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recoveries as gross income and any associated legal fees incurred as
59
deductions.1
Expanding on its view that the right to a recovery belongs to the
client alone, the Tax Court found the argument that the assistance of an
attorney was necessary to pursue a claim unpersuasive. 16° The court
refused to convert the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship
into a joint venture or partnership giving the attorney his own rights to
61
the eventual recovery by the client. 1
Although the court recognized the potential unfairness to
taxpayers who are forced to include contingent legal fees in gross
income but may not deduct the fees due to statutory limitations, 16it2
maintained that issues of tax policy are for Congress to decide.
Further, the court recognized the potential danger in trying to fashion
63
remedies for unfairness by modifying established tax law principles. 1
The Tax Court's view regarding the proper tax treatment of
contingent attorney's fees is not unique.'" While some courts have
rights in funds recovered on behalf of his client and that the total amount recovered by the
taxpayer is gross income to him).
159. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 411 (stating that the court "has, for an extended period of time,
held the view that taxable recoveries in lawsuits are gross income in their entirety to the partyclient and that associated legal fees-contingent or otherwise-are to be treated as deductions").
160. Id. at 413 (stating that "[a]ttorney's fees, contingent or otherwise, are merely a cost of
litigation in pursuing a client's personal rights").
161. See id. (declining to accept that the "speculative nature" of a claim was evidence of
greater rights held by an attorney under a contingent fee arrangement); see also Deborah A. Geier
& Maxine Aaronson, Point & Counterpoint:Plaintiff'sAttorney Fees and Costs, 19 A.B.A. SEC.
OF TAX'N NEWSLETTER 13, 14 (2000) (stating that just because "a relationship might be
'conceptualized' as a partnership does not mean that it should be so treated for tax
purposes .... ").
162. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 407. The court stated:
[I]f the AMT computation effectively renders de minimus a taxpayer's recovery due to
the nondeductibility of the attorney's fees, we should not be tempted to modify
established assignment of income principles to remedy the situation. That could result
in a certain class of taxpayers (those who receive reportable income from judgments)
being treated differently from all other taxpayers who are subject to the AMT. These
are matters within Congress' authority to decide. Congress, not the courts, is the final
arbiter of how the tax burden is to be borne by taxpayers.
Id. at 415.
163. Id. at 407 (arguing that there is risk in the "ad hoc modification of established tax law
principles or doctrines to counteract hardship in specific cases .... "). In Kenseth I, the Tax Court
explained its reluctance to acquiesce in approaches putting equity ahead of the plain language of
the law. Id.
164. In addition to the Tax Court, the United States Court of Federal Claims heard cases that
served as the basis for the circuit split on contingent attorney's fees. See Baylin v. United States,
30 Fed. Cl. 248 (Fed. Cl. 1993), ajftd, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In Baylin, a partnership
taxpayer hired an attorney under a contingent fee arrangement to appeal a condemnation award
against the Maryland State Highway Administration. Id. at 250-51. The parties agreed to a
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held to the contrary, the Tax Court's reasoning in Kenseth I clearly
65
articulates the majority approach in the circuits.1

III. DISCUSSION
The Tax Court has consistently required contingent attorney's fees
incurred in obtaining a taxable recovery to be included in the taxpayer's

settlement of $16,319,522.91 and the partnership paid $4,843,622 of this amount to its attorney as
legal fees. Id. at 25 1. The partnership reported income from the condemnation award net of the
legal fees paid and the Commissioner objected. Id. at 252. The Court of Federal Claims used the
Tax Court's reasoning to require the inclusion of contingent attorney's fees in the gross income of
the partnership. Id. at 258. Like the Tax Court, the court in Baylin used the assignment-ofincome doctrine to hold that although the partnership did not take actual possession of the funds it
paid to its attorney, it received the benefit of those funds because they discharged the obligation
of the partnership to pay its attorney. Id. Accordingly, the court held the partnership liable for
the tax due on the entire settlement amount. Id. at 259. In addition, the court dismissed the
argument that Alabama state law vested an ownership interest in the taxpayer's attorney with
respect to the contingent fee portion of a damage recovery. Id. at 258. Five years after Baylin,
the same issue came before the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in
Foster v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (N.D. Ala. 2000), aff'd, 249 F.3d 1275 (11 th Cir.
2001). In Foster, the court reluctantly upheld Alabama precedent by holding that attorney's
contingent fees related to a punitive damages recovery are excludable from the client's gross
income. Id. at 1237-38 (acknowledging that Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.
1959), originally tried in the Tax Court, was binding on Foster due to the factual similarity of the
two cases). The court, however, noted that it had "serious and legitimate questions" as to whether
the exclusion of contingent attorney's fees was the proper treatment and whether it should
continue to be followed by the courts. Id. at 1239. Ultimately, however, the Alabama district
court could not distinguish Foster from Cotnam and was required to follow it as binding
precedent in the Fifth Circuit. Id. Although generally, taxpayers litigate disputes with the IRS in
the Tax Court, the decision by a taxpayer of the forum it will use to dispute a tax deficiency
assessed by the IRS is dependant on several factors. See IRS, PUB. No. 1, YOUR RIGHTS AS A
TAXPAYER 2 (2000). Generally, a taxpayer may contest a proposed tax deficiency either by filing
a timely petition in the Tax Court (which does not require a prior payment of the deficiency), or
by paying the deficiency and, after exhausting administrative remedies, suing for a refund in
either the taxpayer's local district court or in the Court of Federal Claims. Id.
165. See, e.g., Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2122, 2126-27 (2000)
(holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to her attorney related to a sexual
harassment lawsuit against her former employer), affd sub nom. Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d
1312 (10th Cir. 2001); Young v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 152, 157 (1999) (holding that the taxpayer
must include the contingent attorney's fees paid in settling a property dispute incident to a
divorce), aff'd, 240 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2001); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M.
(CCH) 787, 791 (1998) (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to his
attorney related to tort and contract claims against his former employer), aff'd, 219 F.3d 941,
943-44 (9th Cir. 2000); Sinyard v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 654, 658 (1998) (holding that a
taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to his attorneys related to a class action age
discrimination claim against his former employer), aff'd, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001); Coady v.
Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 257, 259 (1998) (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent
fees paid to her attorney related to a wrongful termination suit against her former employer),
aft'd, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000).
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gross income.166 However, a deep dichotomy exists in the United States
Courts of Appeals. 167 The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
steadfastly oppose the inclusion of contingent attorney's fees, 168 while
the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Federal Circuits strongly
69
support the inclusion position of the Tax Court. 1
A. The Case For Exclusion
Out of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits' cases allowing for the
exclusion of contingent attorney's fees from a client's gross income,
two prevailing themes surfaced. 70 First, the courts in these cases

166. See supra Part II.F (analyzing the Tax Court's view regarding contingent attorney's
fees).
167. See supra notes 11-12 (listing those cases requiring inclusion and those permitting
exclusion of contingent attorneys fees); see also infra Part III.A (discussing the position of the
courts permitting exclusion of contingent attorney's fees from gross income); Part III.B
(examining the rationale of the courts requiring inclusion of contingent attorney's fees in gross
income).
168. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a taxpayer
could exclude the contingent fees paid to his attorney in connection with a defamation claim
against a television station); Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11 th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(holding that a taxpayer could exclude the contingent fees paid to her attorney for his assistance
related to her claims against a mortgage company for fraud, conspiracy, and breach of contract);
Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a taxpayer could
exclude the contingent attorney's fees paid by a decedent's estate related to a lawsuit against the
decedent's former employer); Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126 (holding that a taxpayer could exclude the
contingent fees paid to her attorney for his services related to her claim to enforce an oral contract
against an intestate decedent's estate); see also infra Part III.A (discussing the reasoning of the
courts allowing the exclusion of contingent fees from gross income).
169. See Campbell, 274 F.3d at 1313-14 (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent
fees paid to her attorney related to a sexual harassment lawsuit against her former employer);
Sinyard, 268 F.3d at 759 (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to his
attorneys related to a class action age discrimination claim against his former employer); Kenseth
11, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent
attorney's fees paid related to an age discrimination suit against his former employer); Young v.
Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the taxpayer must include the
contingent attorney's fees paid in settling a property dispute incident to a divorce); BenciWoodward, 219 F.3d at 943-44 (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to
his attorney related to tort and contract claims against his former employer); Coady, 213 F.3d at
1190 (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to her attorney related to a
wrongful termination suit against her former employer); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451,
1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that a partnership taxpayer must include the attorney's fees paid in
connection with a condemnation lawsuit against the State of Maryland); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319
F.2d 532, 532 (3d Cir. 1963) (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to his
attorney related to a wrongful discharge action against his former employer); see also infra Part
III.B (discussing the reasoning of the courts requiring inclusion of contingent fees in gross
income).
170. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's rationale based on state law in
Cotnam v. Commissioner); infra Part III.A.4 (discussing the Sixth Circuit's rational based on the
relationship of the attorney and the taxpayer in Estate of Clarks v. Commissioner).
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pointed to relevant state attorney's lien statutes to hold that clients
transfer "property" to their attorneys through contingent fee
agreements. 17 1 Based on this property transfer, these courts concluded
172
that an attorney possesses an equitable interest in his client's claim.
Second, these courts cite the inherent risk involved in litigation and the
necessity of counsel as evidence that a partnership exists between the
client and his attorney. 173 Accordingly, the courts conclude that each
partner, the attorney and the client, earns, receives, 74and should pay tax
on their respective portions of the eventual recovery. 1
1. The Fifth Circuit Sets the Stage
The Fifth Circuit was the first to hold that contingent attorney's fees
should be excluded from a taxpayer's gross income. 175 In Cotnam v.
Commissioner, Ethel Cotnam entered into a verbal agreement with T.
Shannon Hunter in 1940 under which she agreed to perform services as
his attendant in the last years of his life in exchange for his promise to
bequeath to her a one-fifth interest in his estate. 176 Although Mrs.
Cotnam performed the agreed-upon services, Mr. Hunter died intestate
five years later. 177 After the administrator refused to recognize Mrs.
Cotnam's claim, she filed a successful action against the estate to
enforce her contract and received a judgment in the amount of
$120,000.178 Mrs. Cotnam paid her attorneys out of this judgment

171. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125; infra Part III.A.I (examining the relevance of state law to
the Fifth Circuit's contingent attorney's fee analysis).
172. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125. The court in Cotnam held that an Alabama attorney's lien
statute granted an equity interest to a client's attorney, allowing the client to exclude the
attorney's fee portion of his recovery from gross income. Id.; see also Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347
(adhering to the state law rationale set forth in Cotnam). Both the transfer of "income" and the
transfer of "property" fall under the assignment-of-income doctrine. See supra notes 61-102 and
accompanying text (discussing the origin and development of the assignment-of-income
doctrine); infra Part III.A.I (discussing the Fifth Circuits' decision in Cotnam); infra Part III.A.3
(discussing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Davis).
173. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347 (holding that Cotnam controlled the analysis in Davis); see infra
Part III.A.I (discussing Cotnam); Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126 (stating that the services provided by
Mrs. Cotnam's attorneys converted her claim into a judgment so that the amount of the contingent
fee was earned by her attorneys); infra Part III.A.3 (discussing Davis).
174. See Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he value of
taxpayer's lawsuit was entirely speculative and dependent on the services of counsel.").
175. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
176. Comnam v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 947, 947 (1957), aft d, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
177. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 120. A person who dies intestate is one who has died without
making a valid will. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 827 (7th ed. 1999).
178. Conam, 28 T.C. at 947. The amount actually received by Mrs. Cotnam was the
judgment of $120,000 plus interest, minus her attorney's fees of $50,365.83. Id.
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pursuant to a contingent fee contract. 179 When filing her federal income
tax return, Mrs. Cotnam characterized the entire award as a non-taxable
bequest, 180 and did not include it in her gross income.18 1 The IRS
Commissioner objected and maintained that the entire award constituted
182
gross income from services.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Commissioner that the amount of
the judgment attributable to services performed was taxable income, but
then held that the attorney's fee portion of the award could be excluded
from Mrs. Cotnam's gross income. 183 The court based its holding on an
Alabama attorney's lien statute that granted Alabama lawyers a lien on
the suits, judgments, and decrees of their clients. 184 The court
concluded that Mrs. Cotnam did not realize any economic benefit from
the attorney's fee portion of her recovery. 185 In so holding, the court
found that the Alabama statute gave Mrs. Cotnam's attorneys equal
rights over her judgment. 186 Further, the court explained that Mrs.
Cotnam could never have recovered any income without the aid of
counsel and that the portion of the recovery paid directly to her
87
attorneys was properly taxed to them alone.1

179. Id.
180. See id. at 947, 951. For federal income tax purposes, gross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance. See I.R.C. § 102(a) (1994).
181. Cotnam,28T.C.at947,951.
182. Id. at 947. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner and held that the entire award
should be taxed to Mrs. Cotnam and a corresponding deduction allowed for the attorney's fees
paid. Id. at 953-54.
183. Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959).
184. Id. The relevant portion of the Alabama attorneys' lien statute provided:
'Upon suits, judgments, and decrees for money, [attorneys-at-law] shall have a lien
superior to all liens but tax liens, and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy said suit,
judgment, or decree, until the lien or claim of the attorney for his fees is fully satisfied;
and attorneys at law shall have the same right and power over said suits, judgments,
and decrees, to enforce their liens, as their clients had or may have for the amount due
thereon to them.'
Id. at 125 n.5 (quoting the Alabama Code of 1940).
185. Id..
186. Id. Under the Alabama attorney's lien statute, a taxpayer could not receive the portion of
the award due to her attorney, even if she had settled the claim herself. Id. at 125.
187. Id. at 126. The court observed that the facts of the case combined with the Alabama
statute led to the result in the case. Id. at 125. Writing separately, Fifth Circuit Judges Rives and
Brown noted their agreement with the majority's result but clarified that they rested their
conclusion on the assignment-of-income doctrine and not on the nature of the Alabama statute.
Id. at 126 (stating that "Mrs. Cotnam's tree had borne no fruit and would have been barren if she
had not transferred a part interest in that tree to her attorneys, who then rendered the services
necessary to bring forth the fruit" (citation omitted)). They found that the speculative nature of
Mrs. Cotnam's claim created a duel ownership between she and her attorneys in the recovery she
eventually received from their joint efforts. Id. Indeed, the majority, concurring, and dissenting
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2. The Fifth Circuit Takes Another Look
Over forty years after Cotnam, the Fifth Circuit revisited the taxation
188
of contingent attorney's fees in Srivastava v. Commissioner.
Although upholding the Cotnam precedent, the court's analysis was
noticeably different. 189 In Srivastava, Dr. Sudhir Srivastava, a Texas
physician, settled a defamation suit against a television station for airing
a series of reports charging him with medical ethics violations. 190 Dr.
Srivastava recovered $8.5 million and paid roughly $3.5 million in legal
fees from his settlement under a contingent fee arrangement with his
19
attorneys. 1
Dr. Srivastava did not report any income from the settlement on his
1991 federal income tax return, believing that the entire settlement was
excludable as a recovery for personal injury damages. 192
The
Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency, 193 maintaining that a

opinions in Cotnam all discussed the application of assignment of income principles. Id. at 125,
127. The concurrence, in holding that these principles did not apply, reasoned that Mrs.
Cotnam's claim was uncertain and had no fair market value. Id. at 125. Thus, the economic
benefit related to her claim could only be realized by assigning a portion of the claim to her
attorneys. Id. (stating that Mrs. Cotnam's claim was "worthless" without the skill of her
attorneys). The dissent, acknowledging the clear application of assignment of income principles,
held that the assignment of a portion of Mrs. Comnam's claim discharged her obligation to pay her
attorneys, a clear benefit to Mrs. Cotnam. Id. at 126-27 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). Although the
court was divided and the holding has been widely criticized, the importance of Cotnam in more
recent case law cannot be ignored. Thad Austin Davis, Comam v. Commissioner and the Income
Tax Treatment of Contingency-Based Attorney's Fees-The Alabama Attorney's Charging Lien
Meets Lucas v. Earl Head On, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1683, 1700 (2000). Despite the controversy
surrounding the opinion, courts have been even less receptive to arguments by taxpayers that are
not based on Cotnam. Id. (discussing the skepticism of courts to sanction the reasoning beyond
that used by the court in Cotnam). For example, the Tax Court rejected the argument that a
contingency fee contract with an attorney constitutes a joint venture or partnership. See Kenseth
1, 114 T.C. 399, 413 (2000), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (2001); see also Bagley v. Comm'r, 105 T.C.
396, 418-19 (1995) (rejecting the partnership argument in holding that a partnership is formed
through mutual ownership interests and the sharing of profits and losses), aff'd, 121 F.3d 393 (8th
Cir. 1997).
188. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
189. See id. at 364-65.
190. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 638, 640 (1998), rev'd, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cit.
2000). The television station aired a series of reports accusing Dr. Srivastava of performing
unnecessary surgery and delivering poor quality medical care. Id. These reports destroyed Dr.
Srivastava's practice and caused him severe financial and emotional harm. Id.
191. Id. at 641-42. The actual amount paid in fees by Srivastava to his attorneys was
$3,455,500. Id. at 640.
192. Id.; see supra note 146 (discussing prior law excluding personal injury damages from
gross income and the subsequent amendment limiting the exclusion to awards for physical
injury).
193. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (1994) (authorizing the Secretary of Treasury to issue a notice of
deficiency when it is determined that there is a deficiency in respect to any tax imposed by the
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portion of the settlement represented taxable punitive damages and
interest income. 194 Dr. Srivastava pursued his claim in the Tax Court
which upheld the Commissioner's determination. 195
The court
determined that the punitive damages portion of Dr. Srivastava's
settlement was gross income to him and that he was entitled to a
miscellaneous itemized deduction for the related attorney's fees paid
196
from his settlement.
On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding
that Cotnam v. Commissioner197 was binding precedent and that Dr.
Srivastava could exclude the attorney's fee portion of his settlement
from his gross income.1 98 Interestingly, the court stated that if it were
ruling on a "tabula rasa,"' 99 it would be inclined to include Dr.
Srivastava's contingent fees in gross income. 200 In support of its
"tabula rasa" analysis, the court found no distinction between a
contingent fee contract and a contract under which a client agrees to pay
his attorney on an hourly basis. 20 1 It reasoned that principles of tax
neutrality dictate that such a choice should not alter the tax

Code); see supra note 164 (indicating the ways in which a taxpayer may contest a proposed tax
deficiency).
194. Srivastava, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 642. The IRS notice indicated a tax deficiency of
$1,466,348, which included penalties and interest for the tax years 1991 and 1992. Srivastava,
220 F.3d at 356. The 1992 deficiency was related to the elimination of a net operating loss
carryover attributable to the settlement proceeds received in 1991. Id. at 356 n.4. The
Commissioner's decision was based on a jury award to Dr. Srivastava of $11.5 million in actual
damages and $17.5 million in punitive damages. Srivastava, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 640. Dr.
Srivastava decided to settle rather than facing an appeal, however, the settlement agreement did
not indicate an allocation between actual and punitive damages. Id.
195. Srivastava, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 642. Despite that Srivastava was appealable to the Fifth
Circuit, the Tax Court held for inclusion of attorney's fees because it distinguished the case from
Cotnam based on the difference in state law. Id. at 640; see also supra note 136 (discussing the
Golsen rule); see also infra note 204 (highlighting the differences in Alabama and Texas law
regarding attorney's liens).
196. Srivastava, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 640.
197. Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
198. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 355 (citing Comam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959)).
199. A "tabula rasa" is defined as "a blank tablet ready for writing; a clean slate." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1465 (7th ed. 1999).
200. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 357. The court acknowledged that if it were deciding the matter
on a clean slate, it would apply the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine to require that Dr.
Srivastava include the contingent attorney's fees paid in his gross income. Id. at 363. The court
stated that "when a taxpayer recovers from a favorable judgment or litigation settlement, and
compensates his attorney on a non-contingent basis, the full amount of the recovery may be
treated as gross income." Id. at 357.
201. Id. at 362-63.
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consequences of the fees. 20 2 Further, the court noted that, under an
assignment of income analysis, Dr. Srivastava's contingent attorney's
fees should be characterized as an anticipatory assignment of income
because he benefited from the discharge of the3 obligation to pay his
20
attorney using another source of taxable income.
In light of the court's rejection of the analysis in Cotnam, it could
have distinguished the case based on the fact that Cotnam turned on the
20 4
existence of an Alabama statute, while Srivastava occurred in Texas.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit adhered to the Cotnam precedent by
determining that the assignment-of-income doctrine governs the
contingent fee analysis and that the differences in attorney's rights
granted by state statute do not provide an adequate basis for
distinction. 20 5 In refusing to distinguish Srivastava from Cotnam, the
court explained that it is the taxpayer's degree of control over the
income that is determinative, and not the attorney's bundle of rights
20 6
granted by state law.

202. Id. at 357 (noting that "[tihere is no apparent reason to treat contingent fees differently or
to believe that Congress intended to subsidize contingent fee agreements in such a fashion"). Tax
neutrality is often viewed in the context of the horizontal equity theory which requires that
similarly situated taxpayers be treated equally under the Code and by the courts. See
Rasmusssen, supra note 13, at 316; see also Campbell, supra note 1, at 172 (citing BORIS I.
BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 3.1.4, at
3-9 to 3-10 (3d ed. 1999)) (defining horizontal equity).
203. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363-64. The court determined that the benefit of an attorney's
services in exchange for a contingent fee was not to be excluded from gross income solely on the
basis that the money is diverted to, and realized by, the taxpayer's assignee. Id. at 363.
204. Id. The court acknowledged that Texas law did not confer the same degree of power to
an attorney, as did the Alabama attorney's lien statute applicable in Comam. Id. However, the
court refused to base its analysis on this distinction, choosing rather to adhere to the assignmentof-income doctrine. Id. at 363-64. Compare ALA. CODE § 34-3-61(b) (1997) (stating that
"attorney's-at-law shall have the same right and power over action or judgment to enforce their
liens as their clients had or may have for the amount due thereon to them"), with Srivastava, 220
F.3d at 364, n.33 (citing Texas law in stating that "even when the attorney has been assigned an
ownership interest in his clients cause of action, his rights remain wholly derivative from those of
his client," and "the client's action is indivisible and may not be tried for only a percentage of the
cause of action").
205. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 364. The court concluded that it could not distinguish Srivastava
from Comtam because the differences in attorney's rights granted by state statute do not
"meaningfully affect the economic reality facing the taxpayer-plaintiff." Id. Judge Dennis
concurred in the opinion but dissented as to the treatment of the state statute issue. Id. at 367
(Dennis, J., dissenting in part). "[Ulnder Texas law, unlike that of Alabama, an attorney is not
granted by statute the same right and power as his client over his client's cause of action and
judgment for the independent enforcement of his attorney's fee claim." Id. at 369 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting). He argued that the difference in control granted by the state laws in Alabama and
Texas did play a significant role and should be a meaningful factor. Id. (Dennis, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 364; see also RESEARCH INST. OF AM., ARE ATrORNEY'S FEES PAYABLE OUT OF
JUDGMENT 'ASSIGNED INCOME,' FED. TAX COORDINATOR ch. J-8258 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing
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3. The Eleventh Circuit Follows Suit
The Eleventh Circuit followed the Cotnam rule in Davis v.
Commissioner.20 7 In that case, Ms. Willie Mae Barlow Davis prevailed
in a suit against a mortgage company for fraud, conspiracy, and breach
of contract and she ultimately received a $6.1 million judgment, of
which $6 million represented punitive damages. 20 8 Under a contingent
fee contract, she paid her attorneys $3.1 million in fees from that
judgment. 2° Ms. Davis did not report any of the award on her federal
income tax return, and, as a result of an audit, the Commissioner
determined that the entire award constituted gross income. 210 The
Commissioner allowed a deduction for attorney's fees and assessed a
211
tax deficiency of $1.4 million.
Although Ms. Davis appealed her case, the Tax Court was required to
follow Cotnam because it was the controlling decision of the circuit
the importance of an attorney's control over the outcome of a client's lawsuit). Commentators
have suggested that the court's holding in Srivastava, based on the forty-one year old Cotnam
precedent, is reminiscent of the wisdom of former Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. See
Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 305. Justice Black wrote, "[w]hen precedent and precedent alone is
all the argument that can be made to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator
to destroy it." Id.
207. Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). The Eleventh Circuit
split off from the old Fifth Circuit in 1981 and continues to be bound by the Cotnam precedent to
the same extent as is the current Fifth Circuit. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-752, § 2, 94 Stat. 1994 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1994)). Prior to 1981, the Fifth Circuit consisted of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia, and Florida. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act, effective
October 1, 1981, moved Alabama, Georgia, and Florida to the newly created Eleventh Circuit.
Id.
208. Davis v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 46, 47 (1998), aff'd, 210 F.3d 1346 (lth Cir. 2000)
(per curiam). In Davis, the plaintiff applied for a home loan of $2,000 from American Home
Improvement Services of Alabama, Inc. ("American Home"). Id. American Home denied the
plaintiff's application, but later offered to loan her the money if she would make certain
improvements to her home at a cost of $6,000. Id. American Home offered to add the cost of the
improvements to the loan amount. Id. On August 2, 1988, the plaintiff contracted with American
Home to make the repairs, and in exchange, American Home lent the plaintiff $8,000. Id. The
next day, the plaintiff decided against making the repairs and attempted to cancel the repair
contract and mortgage loan. Id. American Home refused to cancel the contract, and the repairs
were made to the plaintiff's home. Id. The plaintiff filed suit seeking compensatory and punitive
damages for the defendant's alleged acts of fraud, conspiracy, and breach of contract. Id. A jury
awarded the plaintiff $6,151,000, of which $152,000 was for compensatory damages and the
remainder consisted of punitive damages. Id. The court upheld the punitive damages award, and
American Home paid the damages to the plaintiff. Id. Pursuant to a contingent fee contract, the
plaintiff paid her attorneys $3,111,809 in legal fees and retained $3,039,191 of the award. Davis,
210 F.3d at 1346.
209. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347.
210. Id.
211. Id. The Commissioner limited the allowed deduction for legal fees and costs to
$3,069,250. Id.
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court to which Davis appealed.2 12 Distinguishing a long line of contrary
precedent, 2 13 the Tax Court held that Ms. Davis could exclude the entire
attorney's fee portion of her award. 2 14 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court and held without further explanation that Cotnam
controlled.2 15 Although the Eleventh Circuit's analysis was based
solely on precedent, the absence of an explanation in the court's opinion
216
signaled its reluctance to overturn the rationale set forth in Cotnam.

212. See supra note 136 (discussing the Golsen rule). Here, because the Eleventh Circuit was
bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, the Tax Court was required to adhere to the precedent set in
Cotnam. See supra note 207 (discussing the reorganization of the Fifth Circuit).
213. See, e.g., Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2122, 2126-27 (2000)
(holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to her attorney related to a sexual
harassment lawsuit against her former employer), aff'd sub nom. Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d
1312 (10th Cir. 2001); Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. 399 (2000) (holding that a taxpayer must include in
gross income the contingent attorney's fees paid related to an age discrimination suit against his
former employer), affd, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001); Young v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 152, 157
(1999) (holding that the taxpayer must include in gross income the contingent attorney's fees paid
in settling a property dispute incident to a divorce), aff'd, 240 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2001);
Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 787, 791 (1998) (holding that a taxpayer must
include in gross income the contingent fees paid to his attorney related to tort and contract claims
against his former employer), aff'd, 219 F.3d 941, 943-44 (9th Cir. 2000); Sinyard v. Comm'r, 76
T.C.M. (CCH) 654, 658 (1998) (holding that a taxpayer must include in gross income the
contingent fees paid to his attorneys related to a class action age discrimination claim against his
former employer), aff'd, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001); Coady v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 257,
259 (1998) (holding that a taxpayer must include in gross income the contingent fees paid to her
attorney related to a wrongful termination suit against her former employer), aff'd, 213 F.3d
1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000).
214. Davis v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 46,48 (1998).
215. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347 n.4. "Because Cotnam is squarely on point and controlling, as
the IRS acknowledges, we affirm the Tax Court on this issue." Id. at 1347. Most recently, the
Eleventh Circuit again bowed to Cotnam in Foster v. United States. Foster v. United States, 249
F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001). The taxpayer in that case entered into a contingent fee
arrangement prior to receiving punitive damages in the amount of $1 million, of which the
taxpayer received $500,000 and her attorneys received approximately $500,000. Foster v. United
States, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1235 (N.D. Ala. 2000), aff'd, 249 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2001). In
addition, interest of $156,032.80 accrued by the time the judgment was paid. Id. The entire
interest portion was paid to the attorneys pursuant to an appellate services agreement between the
taxpayer and her attorneys. Id. at 1238. Reasoning that the entire amount of the award
represented non-taxable damages, Ms. Foster reported no gross income from the award. Id. at
1236. However, the Commissioner disagreed, and the case was appealed to the federal district
court. Id. The district court validated the government's argument and required Ms. Foster to pay
income tax on the punitive damages portion of the award, as well as the interest portion and the
amount paid to her attorneys under the contingent fee contract. Id. at 1238. The Eleventh Circuit,
following Cotnam, affirmed the district court, and held that Ms. Foster was not required to
include the contingent fee portion of her award in gross income. Foster, 249 F.3d at 1280
(reasoning that, through the contingent fee contract, Ms. Foster had transferred to her attorneys
half of her claim).
216. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347 n.4. It is unclear how the Eleventh Circuit, which includes
Georgia and Florida, would treat contingent attorney's fees for income tax purposes. See Serven,
supra note 18, at 377 n.33. Its decision in Davis v. Commissioner was based on Alabama's
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4. The Sixth Circuit Takes a New Approach
In Estate of Clarks v. United States, the Sixth Circuit joined the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits in holding that contingent fees paid to an attorney
do not constitute gross income to the client. 2 17 However, the Sixth
Circuit's analysis provided a new perspective. 218 In this case, Arthur
Clarks suffered severe injuries during his employment. 2 19
He
successfully sued his employer and recovered approximately $11.4
million in damages. 220 Pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement, Mr.
Clarks' attorney received $3.8 million out of the award. 221 After his
death, Mr. Clarks' estate excluded the attorney's fee portion of his
recovery from gross income when filing his federal income tax return,
but the Commissioner subsequently assessed a deficiency of
The IRS allowed a corresponding
approximately $255,000.222
miscellaneous itemized deduction in the amount of the attorney's fees
related to the taxable portion of the award.2 23
At the outset, the Sixth Circuit recognized the conflict among the
federal courts with respect to contingent attorney's fees. 224 Contrary to
the majority of the recent circuit decisions, the Sixth Circuit adopted the
holding of Cotnam, but chose to focus its analysis more on the attorney-

attorney's lien statute, so the Eleventh Circuit may not be bound to its holding in cases arising in
Georgia or Florida. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347.
217. Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 2000).
218. See id. at 858 (following the Cotnam holding but analyzing the facts of the case using the
assignment-of-income doctrine instead of state law).
219. Id. at 855. Mr. Clarks worked for K-mart and sustained closed-head injuries while he
was unloading a truck at a K-Mart facility on November 13, 1994. Estate of Clarks v. United
States, 1998 WL 839415, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
220. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855. The actual amount of the estate's award was
$11,307,837.55, which included $5,600,000 in damages and $5,707,837.55 in accrued interest.
Id.
221. Id. The actual amount retained by Mr. Clark's attorney was $3,766,471.21. Id.
222. Id. The actual amount of tax deficiency was $254,298. Id. Although the damages
awarded for physical injuries were excluded from gross income under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), the
attorney's fees allocable to the interest portion of the award were taxable as gross income under
I.R.C. § 61(a). Id. Section 104(a)(2) states:
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed
under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross
income does not include ... the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages)
received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic
payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness ....
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994); see also supra note 46 (citing I.R.C. § 61(a)).
223. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855.
224. Id. at 856. The court compared Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959),
with Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995) to illustrate the conflict among the
circuit courts regarding the tax treatment of contingent attorney's fees. Id.
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client relationship with respect to the claim and less on state law
concerns. 225 The court rested its analysis on the speculative nature of
Mr. Clarks' claim and reasoned that a successful outcome was largely
dependent on the services of his attorney. 226 Accordingly, the Sixth
Circuit likened the relationship between Mr. Clarks and his attorneys to
a partnership or joint venture and held that Mr. Clarks had transferred
227
an interest in his claim through their contingent fee contract.
The court in Estate of Clarks contrasted the uncertain nature of the
income recovered as attorney's fees against the compensation and
interest income already earned and payable in cases such as Lucas v.
Earl228 and Helvering v. Horst.2 29 The court further determined that the
assignment-of-income doctrine does not apply to transfers to an attorney
of a portion of a client's award under a contingent fee contract.2 3 ° In so
holding, the Sixth Circuit revised the familiar fruit-tree metaphor from
Lucas v. Earl23 1 and concluded that the taxpayer in Estate of Clarks had
transferred some of the trees in his orchard and not merely the fruit from
the trees. 232 Just like a transfer of a partial interest in property, the court
viewed the assignment of a portion of Mr. Clark's award as income
233
belonging to his attorney and properly taxed only to him.

225. Id. at 857. Although certainly not the center of its analysis, the court did mention that the
common law lien under Michigan law operated "more or less the same way as the Alabama lien
in Cotnam." Id. at 856. Similar to the Alabama statute, Michigan common law provides that "the
[contingent feel agreement.., amounts to an assignment of a portion of the judgment sought to
be recovered .... " Dreiband v. Candler, 131 N.W. 129, 129 (Mich. 1911).
226. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
227. Id. The court reasoned that Mr. Clarks assigned his attorney a one-third interest in the
venture in order to have a chance to recover the remaining two-thirds. Id. The court further
stated that Mr. Clark's claim without his attorney "simply amounted to an intangible, contingent
expectancy." Id.
228. Id. (citing Lucas v. Earl and Helvering v. Horst); see supra notes 66-91 and
accompanying text (discussing Earl and Horst).
229. Id.
230. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857-58 (stating that the income transferred in Earl and
Horst was "already earned, vested and relatively certain to be paid to the assignor"). The Sixth
Circuit also found significant that the seminal assignment of income cases centered on gratuitous
transfers to family members, which were not at issue in Estate of Clarks. Id. at 857; see also
supra Part I.C (discussing the origin and development of the assignment-of-income doctrine).
231. Earl, 281 U.S. at 115.
232. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858. The court stated that the taxpayer had "transferred
some of the trees in his orchard, not merely the fruit from the trees" thereby rendering his
attorney akin to a "tenant in common of the orchard owner." Id. The court further compared the
attorney to a "tenant in common" of an orchard owner who "must cultivate and care for and
harvest the fruit of the entire tract." Id.
233. Id.
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Based on the holdings in Cotnam, Srivastava, Davis, and Estate of
Clarks, it is evident that taxpayers have not been completely
unsuccessful in convincing the courts that the exclusion of contingent
attorney's fees is proper. 234 However, the clear majority of the circuit
courts have held that a taxpayer's gross income should include the
entire amount of a taxable judgment or settlement, including amounts
235
paid to an attorney under a contingent fee contract.
B. The Casefor Inclusion
An increasing majority of courts have held that contingent attorney's
236
fees paid to an attorney are includible in the client's gross income.
They do so based on the plain language of the Code as well as on
237
established precedent applying the assignment-of-income doctrine.
1. The Third Circuit's Early Adherence to Assignment of
Income Principles
Shortly after the Fifth Circuit decided Cotnam, the Third Circuit
238
faced the contingent attorney's fee issue in O'Brien v. Commissioner.
In this case, Walter O'Brien worked for years as a deputy collector of
internal revenue in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania before being discharged
in 1952.239 Mr. O'Brien filed a lawsuit against his former employer for
wrongful discharge and contract interference and was reinstated to his
job pursuant to an order of the District Court for the District of
Columbia. 240 Mr. O'Brien then filed a claim in the United States Court
of Claims to recover the salary he lost during the period between his
termination from service and his reinstatement and received a recovery

234. See supra notes 170-233 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale used by courts
to allow taxpayers to exclude contingent attorney's fees from gross income).
235. See infra Part III.B (discussing the rationale used by courts to require taxpayers to
include contingent attorney's fees in gross income).
236. See supra note 11 (citing cases in which inclusion of contingent attorney's fees in gross
income was required).
237. See, e.g., Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the client's discharge of an obligation to pay legal fees owed by her is a benefit to the client
within the definition of gross income); Kenseth R, 259 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001) (using
assignment of income principles to require the taxpayer to include contingent attorney's fees in
gross income); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that the
reasoning of Earl and Horst require that the client be taxed on the contingent legal fees paid to his
attorney).
238. O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963).
239. O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707, 708 (1962), aff'd per curiam, 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1963).
240. Id.
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of approximately $16,000.24 1
Mr. O'Brien paid his attorney
242
approximately $8,200 in legal fees under a contingent fee contract.
He did not include any of his recovery in his gross income on his
federal income tax return, reasoning that it was afforded special tax
treatment under the Code. 24 3 The Commissioner assessed a deficiency
of approximately $2,200 after concluding that the entire amount of Mr.
O'Brien's recovery was gross
income and that he was entitled to a
244
deduction for legal expenses.
Affirming the Tax Court, the Third Circuit held that the contingent
attorney's fee portion of the taxpayer's recovery should be included in
gross income. 245 The court held, in dictum, that even if there had been a
Pennsylvania law that gave attorneys an equitable lien in the client's
recovery, it would not have served to allow the taxpayer to exclude the
contingent attorney's fees from gross income. 246 In dismissing the
relevance of state law to the contingent attorney's fee issue, the Third
Circuit expressly endorsed the application of the assignment-of-income
24 7
doctrine to this issue.
2. The Federal Circuit Analysis
The Federal Circuit addressed the proper taxation of contingent
attorney's fees in Baylin v. United States and added depth to the

241. Id. The actual amount of the recovery obtained by Mr. O'Brien was $16,173.05, which
was calculated at a rate of $4,455 per year from January 29, 1952, to December 31, 1956, less any
income earned by him during that period from other employment. Id.
242. Id. at 708-09. The actual amount paid to Mr. O'Brien's attorney was $8,243.10. Id. at
709.
243. Id. Mr. O'Brien believed that his recovery was not includable in gross income under
I.R.C. § 1303, which at the time, allowed a taxpayer to spread an award of back pay among
several taxable years. Id. at 709-10. Section 1303 was repealed effective December 31, 1986.
I.R.C. § 1303 (1982) (repealed 1986).
244. O'Brien, 38 T.C. at 708, 710. The exact amount of the deficiency was $2,205.33. Id. at
708.
245. O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532, 532 (3d Cir. 1963) ("We find the decision of the Tax
Court is correct in all respects and accordingly it will be affirmed on the excellent opinion of
Judge Raum."); see O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707 (1962), aff d per curiam, 319 F.2d 532 (3d
Cir. 1963).
246. See O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. at 712. The court stated that
even had the taxpayer made an irrevocable assignment of his future recovery to his
attorney to such an extent that he never thereafter became entitled thereto for even a
split second, it would still be gross income to him under the familiar principles of
Lucas v. Earl and Helvering v. Horst.
Id. (citations omitted).
247. See O'Brien, 319 F.2d at 532.
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application of assignment of income principles. 248 Baylin involved a
dispute between a partnership taxpayer and the Maryland State
Highway Administration. 249 Maryland condemned 137 acres of the
partnership's land to build a highway and paid the partnership
inadequate compensation in exchange. 250 The partnership sued the
Highway Administration in the Court of Federal Claims, and with the
aid of attorneys retained under a contingent fee contract, recovered
triple the amount originally offered by the state. 25 1 The partnership
argued that, because it assigned a portion of the award to its attorneys in
252
advance, the partnership never realized the income.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit flatly rejected the partnership's
argument and refused to "elevate form over substance." 253 The court,
instead, characterized the contingent fee arrangement as a discharge of
an obligation of the partnership that provided a clearly realized benefit
254
appropriately taxed to the partnership.
248. Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1453-54 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also supra Part II.C
(discussing the origin and development of the assignment of income doctrine).
249. Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1452.
250. Id. The Maryland State Highway Commission estimated the fair market value of the
partnership's property at nearly $2.7 million. Id. The partnership disagreed and filed suit in state
court, and a jury awarded the partnership approximately $3.9 million plus interest and costs. Id.
The partnership appealed the jury's condemnation award with the assistance of counsel retained
on a contingent fee. Id. The appeals court determined that the trial court applied the wrong
valuation standard to the property and remanded for a new valuation. Id. at 1452-53. In
response, Maryland offered a settlement, and after negotiations, the parties agreed to a settlement
of $16.3 million. Id. at 1453.
251. Id. The partnership received its condemnation award and interest between 1981 and
1988 and paid legal fees on $4 million. Id.
252. Id. at 1454. The partnership had argued first that it was entitled to deduct the legal fees
including the fees allocable to the interest portion of the recovery as a business expense. Id. at
1453. The court used the "origin of the claim" test to reject this argument. Id. at 1453-54; see
also supra note 115 (discussing the "origin of the claim" test). The court held that the partnership
could not base the tax treatment of its legal fees on the relative amounts of principal and interest
received. Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1453. The court reasoned that such an allocation would be improper
because the focus of the "origin of the claim" test is not the proportional recovery of each type of
income, but rather the origin and character of the claim with respect to which the fees were
incurred. Id.
253. Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454. Noting that "[v]ery little need be said about this argument,
which, if accepted, would elevate form over substance and allow the partnership to escape
taxation on a portion of its income through a 'skillfully devised' fee arrangement." Id. (quoting
Justice Holmes in Lucas v. Earl,281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930)).
254. Id. The partnership further argued that Maryland law gave attorneys a lien on the claim
of their client. Id. at 1455. The court was not persuaded, however, and held the argument was
"simply without legal basis." Id. The Maryland statute gave an attorney a lien on "attorney's
fees and compensation specially agreed on with the attorney's client." MD. CODE ANN., BUS.
OCC.& PROF. § 10-501 (1989). The court rejected the argument that this statute gave an attorney
an ownership interest in his client's claim reasoning that Maryland courts had not interpreted the
state lien statutes as creating such an interest. Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455.
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3. The Ninth Circuit
In a trio of recent cases, the Ninth Circuit addressed the taxation of
contingent attorney's fees with consistent results. 255 In the first case,
Coady v. Commissioner, Mrs. Nona Coady filed a wrongful termination
suit against her former employer after being discharged.25 6 Mrs. Coady
eventually recovered nearly $374,000 in compensatory damages. 257 Out
of that amount, Mrs. Coady paid her attorneys approximately $221,000
in fees and costs pursuant to a contingent fee agreement. 25 8 On their
joint federal income tax return, the Coadys reported as income from
wages the portion of the award allocable to lost wages and reported the
amount allocable to future earnings and lost pension benefits as selfemployment25 9 income.26° Against the amount reported as selfemployment income, the Coadys deducted approximately $168,000 in
attorney's fees and costs.26 1 After the Commissioner issued a notice of
deficiency for $49,531 in tax to the Coadys, they conceded that the
262
damages should not have been reported as self-employment income.
Instead, they advanced the argument that, under Cotnam, they had not

255. See Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a taxpayer must
include the contingent fees paid to his attorneys related to a class action age discrimination claim
against his former employer); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941, 943-44 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to his attorney related to tort and
contract claims against his former employer); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to her attorney related to a
wrongful termination suit against her former employer).
256. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1187-88.
257. Id. at 1187. The exact amount of Mrs. Coady's judgment was $373,307, including
$89,225 for back pay, $76,980 for future lost earnings, and $207,102 for lost fringe and pension
benefits. Id.
258. Id. at 1188. The actual amount paid to Mrs. Coady's attorneys for fees and costs was
$221,338.82. Id.
259. Income from self-employment is defined as gross income derived by an individual from
any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed which are
attributable to such trade or business. See I.R.C. § 1402(a) (1994). Thus, Mrs. Coady treated part
of her award as gross income from a trade or business against which the corresponding attorney's
fees could be deducted without concern for the itemized deduction or AMT limitations that would
otherwise apply. See supra Part II.D (discussing deductions).
260. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1188. The amount reported as self-employment income was
$284,082 comprised of $76,980 in future lost earnings, and $207,102 in lost fringe benefits and
pension benefits. Id. at 1187-88.
261. Id. at 1188. The actual amount of attorney's fees used to offset the self-employment
income was $168,217. Id. In addition, the Coadys took a miscellaneous itemized deduction of
$53,121 for the attorney's fees they allocated to the lost wages portion of Mrs. Coady's recovery.
Id.
262. Id.
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realized the income paid as legal fees because it was assigned to their
263
attorneys.
After recognizing that a split existed among the federal courts, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the assignment-of-income doctrine to conclude
that Mrs. Coady could not exclude from her gross income the portion of
her recovery that was paid to her attorneys as a contingent fee. 264 The
Ninth Circuit relied on the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Baylin265 as
well as the dissent in Cotnam266 in holding that the contingent fee
contract was an anticipatory assignment of income properly taxable to
Mrs. Coady. 267 The court in Coady refused to distinguish a contingency
attorney's fee contract from other creditor situations controlled by the
assignment-of-income doctrine simply because of the speculative nature
268
of the arrangement.
Shortly after Coady, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
contingent attorney's fees again in Benci-Woodward v.
Commissioner.269 The taxpayer in Benci-Woodward won punitive
damages in a lawsuit against his employer involving several tort and
contract claims, including wrongful discharge. 270 In Benci-Woodward,
the Ninth Circuit reinforced its decision in Coady and held that the
portion of the punitive damages award retained by the taxpayer's
attorney pursuant to a contingent fee contract constituted gross income
to the taxpayer. 27 ' As it did in Coady, the Ninth Circuit based its
263. Id.; see also Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that amount of
contingent fee paid out of judgment to taxpayer's attorneys was not income to the taxpayer).
264. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1191. The court compared Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202
F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000) with Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995) in order to
illustrate the conflict among the circuit courts with regard to contingent attorney's fees. Id. at
1189-90.
265. Baylin, 43 F.3d 1451.
266. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126-27 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
267. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1191 (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the
notion that taxation can be escaped by procuring payment directly to creditors or by making
anticipatory arrangements to prevent earnings from 'vesting even for a second' in the person who
earned it") (quoting Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930)).
268. Id. (noting that because "an assignment involves a contingent amount does not alter the
conclusion that taxation cannot be escaped .... "). The court in Coady did not rely on state
attorney's lien law to reach its holding. Id. at 1190. However, the court did note that the Alaska
statute governing attorney's rights under a contingency fee contract granted less of an interest in
the claim than did the Alabama law examined in Cotnam. See id. The court explained that the
Alaska statute confers a "lien which attaches to property belonging to the client" and "does not
confer an ownership interest upon attorneys" such that they have any power over the judgments
of their clients. Id. Contra Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
269. Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000).
270. Id. at 942-43.
271. Id. at 943.
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decision on assignment of income principles, but also pointed out that
equity interest in the cause of
relevant state law did not transfer 27an
2
action of the plaintiff to his attorney.
In the most recent case, Sinyard v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit
solidified its position on the proper taxation of contingent attorney's
fees. 273 In Sinyard, Mr. Sinyard settled an age discrimination claim as a
member in a class action against his former employer. 27 4 The Ninth
276
275
Circuit applied its reasoning from Coady and Benci-Woodward,
holding that the attorney's fee portion of the settlement must be
included in Mr. Sinyard's gross income.277 Once again applying
assignment of income principles, the court rejected the taxpayer's
that state law granted his attorney an equitable
arguments under Cotnam
278
interest in his claim.
Also, Mr. Sinyard unsuccessfully argued that taxing him on the
recovery of attorney's fees, which he never received, was unfair and
produced inequitable treatment due to the Code's limitations on legal
the
fee deductions.2 79 The court was sympathetic, but concluded 2that
80
power to create a remedy for such unfairness rests with Congress.

272. Id. (stating that California law "does not confer any ownership interest upon attorneys or
grant attorneys any right and power over the suits, judgments, or decrees of their clients"); see
also Fifield Manor v. Finston, 354 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Cal. 1960) (explaining that contingent fee
contracts do not confer a part of a client's cause of action to the attorney, but instead give him a
lien upon an eventual recovery by the client).
273. Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001).
274. Id. at 757.
275. Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
276. Benci-Woodward,219 F.3d 941.
277. Sinyard, 268 F.3d at 759.
278. Id. at 760. But see Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959). Mr. Sinyard
was a resident of Alabama when he made the contingent fee contract with his attorneys. Sinyard,
268 F.3d at 759. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Fifth Circuit's previous determination in
Cotnam that a contingent fee contract under Alabama law transfers ownership of a portion of the
claim from the client to the attorney. Id. at 759-60. However, the Ninth Circuit declined to
follow Cotnam and held that Alabama law did not affect the taxation of the contingent fees paid.
Id. at 760.
279. Sinyard, 268 F.3d at 759. Mr. Sinyard argued that it was unfair to tax him on income
paid to his attorney. Id. However, the court maintained that the tax impact of the attorney's fees
resulted from the application of the AMT. Id.
280. See id. The court stated:
Without [the AMT's] limitation, the attorneys' fees would be income to the Sinyards,
and the income would be wiped out by deduction of the total received. It would be a
wash. The anomalous result, no doubt unintended, arises when part of the deduction is
blocked by the AMT. We do not think we can change the basic rules of income tax in
order to correct this result.
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4. The Seventh Circuit Weighs In
In a case that tipped the scales in favor of inclusion, the Seventh
Circuit recently strengthened the position of the Federal Tax Court28 1 in
Kenseth v. Commissioner ("Kenseth If,). 282 Affirming the Tax Court,
the Seventh Circuit endorsed the application of the assignment-ofincome doctrine and held that the entire age discrimination settlement
recovered by Mr. Kenseth, including the attorney's fee portion,
constituted gross income. 283 Although the Seventh Circuit explicitly
recognized the existing circuit split on the proper income tax treatment
of contingent attorney's fees, the court found the reasoning of the Tax
284
Court "clearly correct."
The court in Kenseth H refused to distinguish a contingent fee
contract from a fee arrangement by which a client's attorney is paid by
the hour. 285 In addition, the court rejected the argument that an equity
interest was transferred to Mr. Kenseth's attorney based on the
applicable Wisconsin attorney's lien statute. 286 The Seventh Circuit

281. See supra notes 138-65 and accompanying text (examining the facts of Kenseth I and the
reasoning of the Tax Court with respect to contingent attorney's fees).
282. Kenseth H, 259 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating "[blut with all due respect to those
who disagree, we think the Tax Court's resolution of the issue is clearly correct").
283. Id. at 883-84. The court allowed the Kenseths a miscellaneous itemized deduction for
the attorney's fees paid under the contingent fee arrangement. See id. at 884. The miscellaneous
itemized deduction for attorney's fees is an I.R.C. § 67 deduction which is subject to the twopercent of adjusted gross income limitation. I.R.C. § 67(a) (1994).
284. Kenseth II, 259 F.3d at 883. The court stated:
Taxable income is gross income minus allowable deductions. If a taxpayer obtains
income of $100 at a cost in generating that income of $25, he has gross income of $100
and a deduction of $25, yielding taxable income of $75 ... If, therefore, for some
reason the cost of generating the income is not deductible, he has taxable income of
$100.... That is Kenseth's situation under the alternative minimum tax.
Id. (citations omitted).
285. Id. ("We cannot see what difference it makes that the expense happened to be contingent
rather than fixed."). The court compared an attorney's contingent fee arrangement to
commissions earned by a salesman. Id. "If a firm pays a salesman on a commission basis, the
sales income he generates is income to the firm and his commissions are a deductible expense,
even though they were contingent on his making sales." Id.
286. Id. The Wisconsin attorney's lien statute provides that an attorney has a lien or security
interest but not an ownership interest in the client's cause of action. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 757.36
(West 2001). The statute states:
Any person having or claiming a right of action, sounding in tort or for unliquidated
damages on contract, may contract with any attorney to prosecute the action and give
the attorney a lien upon the cause of action and upon the proceeds or damages derived
in any action brought for the enforcement of the cause of action, as security for fees in
the conduct of the litigation; when such agreement is made and notice thereof given to
the opposite party or his or her attorney, no settlement or adjustment of the action may
be valid as against the lien so created, provided the agreement for fees is fair and
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held that a lien statute merely transfers a security interest in the client's
eventual recovery, not an equitable interest. 287 The court recognized
that there is a risk that a contingent fee attorney will expend effort on
behalf of his client only to have the client terminate the attorney-client
relationship. 288 But, the court reasoned, this situation is not
meaningfully different from any other trade creditor who is "stiffed" by
his debtor. 289 Concluding that Mr. Kenseth could not effectively assign
an interest in his claim to his attorney through a contingent fee contract,
of his income to his
the court held that an assignment of a portion
290
attorney could not serve to shift his tax liability.
Finally, the court explicitly refused to remedy the inequity facing
fees in gross
taxpayers due to the inclusion of contingent attorney's
29 1
income, opting instead to leave that task for Congress.
5. The Fourth Circuit Continues the Trend
The Fourth Circuit joined the courts endorsing the inclusion of
contingent attorney's fees with its decision in Young v.

reasonable. This section shall not be construed as changing the law in respect to
champertous contracts.
Id.
287. Kenseth H, 259 F.3d at 883 ("But the ownership of a security interest is not ownership of
the security."). The court explained the difference between a security interest and a proprietary
interest through an example using interest expense. Id. The court stated that "[a] firm whose
assets are secured by a mortgage can deduct the interest from its income, but it is not allowed to
reduce its income by the amount of the interest. Interest on a secured obligation is just another
expense." Id.
288. Id. at 884.
289. Id. The court indicated that in the situation where a client has confiscated an attorney's
work, the lawyer has a claim against his client, not his client's cause of action. Id. The court
stated that "[iun essence, Kenseth wants us to recharacterize this as a case in which he assigned 40
percent of his tort claim to the law firm. But he didn't. A contingent fee contract is not an
assignment ..... Id.
290. Id. The court stated:
So what Kenseth really is asking us to do is to assign a portion of his income to the law
firm, but of course an assignment of income (as distinct from the assignment of a
contract or an asset that generates income) by a taxpayer is ineffective to shift his tax
liability.
Id.
291. Id. In discussing the potentially harsh results to a taxpayer who is required to include
contingent attorney's fees in gross income and may be denied a deduction for those fees, the court
stated:
[I]n taxation's Garden of Eden, it would indeed be difficult to think of a reason why
Kenseth should have been denied the normal privilege of deducting from his gross
income 100 percent of an expense reasonably incurred for the production of taxable
income ... [but] equity in taxation [is] a political rather than a jural concept.
Id. at 884-85.
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Commissioner.292 In this case, the taxpayer, Mrs. Young, received a
promissory note pursuant to a divorce settlement under which she was
to receive $1.5 million from her ex-husband.2 9 3 In October 1990, Mr.
Young defaulted on his obligations under the divorce settlement
agreement, including the note payable to Mrs. Young. 294 Mrs. Young
sued and eventually agreed to a settlement which provided that she
would receive a fifty-nine acre tract of land in satisfaction of the debt.295
She subsequently received $2.2 million on the sale of the land and paid
$300,606 directly to her attorneys pursuant to a contingent fee
agreement. 22996 Mrs. Young did not report any gain to the IRS on the sale
of the property, and accordingly, did not report any of the fees paid to
7
attorneys.

29

Mrs. Young argued that she never realized the portion of the income
used to pay her attorneys under a contingent fee contract. 298 The Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument, resting its holding on the assignment-ofincome doctrine and finding that the attorney's fee portion of Mrs.
Young's recovery was gross income to her under the reasoning of
30 1
Earl299 and Horst.3°° In explicitly rejecting the holdings in Cotnam
and Estate of Clarks,3 °2 the court in Young reasoned that permitting the
contingent attorney's fees to be excluded would allow Mrs. Young to

292. Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001).
293. Id. at 372.
294. Id.
295. Id. Prior to this settlement, Mr. Young paid only $160,000 toward satisfaction of the
judgment awarded to Mrs. Young as a result of her lawsuit. Id. Before executing the remainder
of the judgment, Mr. and Mrs. Young entered into a settlement agreement and release under
which Mrs. Young was to receive the fifty-nine acre piece of land. Id. Mr. Young retained an
option to repurchase the land for $2.2 million prior to December 1992. Id. Mr. Young assigned
the option to a third party, who exercised it and bought the land from Mrs. Young for $2.2
million. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. Mrs. Young sought to exclude the capital gain on the sale of the land under
I.R.C. § 1041(a)(2) which provides that "'[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer
of property ... to ... a former spouse ... if the transfer is incident to the divorce."' Id.
(quoting I.R.C. § 1041(a)(2) (1994). In rejecting this argument, the Tax Court held that
Mrs. Young could properly exclude the transfer of the land under § 1041(a)(2), but that Mrs.
Young must report the gain derived from the sale of the property to the extent that the sales
price exceeded her husband's basis in the property. Id. at 272-73; see Young v. Comm'r,
113 T.C. 152, 155-56 (1999). A taxpayer's "basis" in property is generally the cost of such
property with certain adjustments. See I.R.C. §§ 1011-1012, 1016 (1994).
298. Young, 240 F.3d at 376; see also Young, 113 T.C. at 157.
299. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
300. Young, 240 F.3d at 377; see also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
301. Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
302. Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
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avoid taxation by skillfully devising the method for paying her
30 3
attorney's fees.
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit refused to distinguish
between a contingent attorney's fee arrangement and an arrangement
under which a client pays an attorney at an hourly rate. 30 4 Further, the
court held that the presumption articulated in Cotnam, that a client's
claim is worthless without the skill of an attorney, overlooked that an
attorney paid by the hour adds just as much value to a claim as a
contingent fee attorney. 30 5 Recognizing that if Mrs. Young had paid her
attorney by the hour, the entire settlement amount would constitute
gross income, the Fourth Circuit held that the same treatment should
30 6
apply under a contingent fee arrangement.
6. The Tenth Circuit Has the Last Word
The most recent Court of Appeals decision relating to the taxation of
contingent attorney's fees came in Campbell v. Commissioner.30 7 In
Campbell, the Tenth Circuit held that the attorney's fee portion of a
taxpayer's recovery for damages constitutes gross income. 30 8 The
taxpayer in Campbell prevailed in a Title VII sexual harassment lawsuit
against her former employer. 309 As a result, she received $150,000, of
which she paid approximately $74,000 directly to her attorneys under a
31
contingent fee contract. 0

303. Young, 240 F.3d at 377 (reasoning that the choice of a contingent fee arrangement to
avoid taxation is the "precise danger the Supreme Court warned against in Earl"); see also Lucas,
281 U.S. at 115 (holding that the "tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skillfully devised .... ").
304. Young, 240 F.3d at 377-78 ("We see no reason to allow her to escape taxation on a
portion of the settlement proceeds simply because she arranged to compensate her attorneys
directly from the proceeds through a contingent fee arrangement.").
305. Id. at 378. Contra Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125 (Rives & Brown, JJ., concurring).
306. Young, 240 F.3d at 378. In addition, the court rejected an analysis of contingent
attorney's fees based on state law rights granted to an attorney. Id. (stating that the taxation of
attorney's fees under a contingent fee contract "should be resolved by proper application of
federal income tax law, not the amount of control state law grants to an attorney over the client's
cause of action"). Id. The court did state that even if state law were considered, the law in North
Carolina did not provide an attorney with an interest in a client's cause of action or judgment
such that control of a portion of the claim would be transferred. Id. at 379.
307. Campbell v. Comrn'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001).
308. Id. at 1313-14.
309. Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2122, 2123 (2000), aff'd sub nom.
Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994 &
Supp. V 2000) (describing unlawful employment practices under Title VII).
310. Campbell, 274 F.3d at 1313. The exact amount paid by Ms. Campbell to her attorneys
was $73,399.25. Id. Originally, Ms. Campbell reported the entire award as "other [i]ncome" and
took a miscellaneous itemized deduction for the attorney's fee portion. Id. However, she later
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The court in Campbell held that the entire award was taxable to Ms.
Campbell. 3 1' In doing so, the court rejected Ms. Campbell's argument
that she lacked the requisite control and beneficial ownership of the
funds paid to her attorneys. 3 12 The court held that, regardless of the
label placed on the contract between Ms. Campbell and her attorneys,
3 13
the end result was that the fee portion of the recovery benefited her.
Ms. Campbell, however, advanced an alternative argument under
Cotnam,3 14 maintaining that the relevant Missouri lien statute gave her
attorneys an ownership interest in her claim and the subsequent
recovery. 3 15 Finding the reasoning in Cotnam unpersuasive, the court
31 6
held that the effect of the Missouri law did not alter its analysis.
The court recognized that a universal standard applicable to
contingent legal fees was needed, and proposed that such a standard
should be applied without regard to state law. 3 17 Responding to Ms.
Campbell's argument that inclusion of attorney's fees produced an
unjust result, the Tenth Circuit stated that Congress, not the courts,
should remedy any unfairness in the Code. 3 18 The Tenth Circuit, having
filed an amended return excluding the award entirely and claiming a refund for the tax paid. Id.
The Commissioner not only denied the refund but also assessed a deficiency of $17,402,
representing an AMT liability that Ms. Campbell did not report on her original or amended tax
returns. Id.
311. Id. at 1313-14.
312. Id.
313. id. (explaining that the legal fee portion of Ms. Campbell's recovery allowed her to
discharge the personal obligation owed to her attorneys).
314. Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
315. Campbell, 274 F.3d at 1314; see also Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 123 (discussing the Alabama
attorneys' lien statute).
316. Campbell, 274 F.3d at 1314 (stating that it would join "the majority of the Circuits [that]
have rejected this argument"). The court determined that the Missouri lien statute granting a lien
interest to secure an attorney's compensation was more like those attorney lien provisions of
States that have been distinguished from the Alabama statute applicable in Cotnam. HukkanenCampbell v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2122, 2126-27 (2000), aff'd sub nom. Campbell v.
Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001). The Missouri attorney's lien statute states:
The compensation of an attorney or counselor for his services is governed by
agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law. From the
commencement of an action or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the
attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or
counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's
favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosesoever hands they may come; and cannot be
affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.130 (West 1987).
317. Campbell, 274 F.3d at 1314. The court stated that "the 'intricacies of any attorney's
bundle of rights,' or the unique provisions of a particular state's attorney lien statute" should not
affect the taxation of contingent attorney's fees. Id.
318. Id. at 1314-15. Ms. Campbell was particularly upset about the effect of the AMT
provision on legal fee deductions that created additional tax liability for her. Id. The court
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the last word on the taxation of contingent attorney's fees, has widened
more compelling the need for a
the gap between the circuits and 3 made
19
issue.
this
to
resolution
consistent
IV.

ANALYSIS

The recent judicial developments strengthening the majority view
have intensified the philosophical split among the federal courts
320
regarding the proper taxation of contingent attorney's fees.
Consistent with the clear weight of authority, courts in every
jurisdiction should require that contingent attorney's fees incurred 32in1
connection with a taxable recovery be included in gross income.
Courts should uniformly reject the inconsistent and misguided tax
treatment 2of contingent attorney's fees by the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
32
Circuits.
A. Inclusion of ContingentAttorney's Fees in Gross Income Properly
Reflects Current Tax Law
The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Federal Circuits
correctly held that a client must include the contingent attorney's fee
portion of a taxable damages recovery in gross income. 323 First, the
plain language of the Code, as well as the judicially developed
324
assignment-of-income doctrine, support the analysis of these circuits.
These courts correctly applied the statutory definition of gross income
to hold that a client receives a taxable benefit through the use of a

recognized the inequity, but maintained that the Code mandated this result, not the courts. Id. at
1315.
319. See id. at 1314.
320. See supra Part III.B (discussing the reasoning of the majority of courts requiring
inclusion); see also Serven, supra note 79, at 83 (acknowledging the effect of the recent case law
developments on the contingent attorney's fee issue).
321. See Serven, supra note 18, at 377; see also infra Part IV.A (arguing that the inclusion of
contingent attorney's fees in gross income properly reflects current tax law).
322. See supra Part III.A (providing the reasoning of the Circuits permitting exclusion); see
also infra Part IV.B (objecting to the reasoning of the circuit courts that have permitted taxpayers
to exclude contingent attorney's fees from gross income).
323. See supra note II and accompanying text (identifying the circuit courts requiring
inclusion of contingent attorney's fees); see also Kenseth 11, 259 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001)
(acknowledging that the inclusion of contingent attorney's fees in gross income is "clearly
correct").
324. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994); see also Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (establishing the
assignment-of- income doctrine); infra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that the language of the I Code
supports the inclusion of contingent attorney's fees in gross income).
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contingent attorney's fee contract. 325 In so holding, the courts correctly
recognized that such a contract falls squarely within the assignment-ofincome doctrine. 326 Second, the circuits favoring inclusion properly
determined that the selection of a particular fee arrangement should not
dictate the tax consequences of the fees. 327 These courts correctly
identified that there is no meaningful distinction between a contingent
fee contract and a fixed fee arrangement that would support differing
tax treatment. 328 Ultimately, the circuits requiring inclusion properly
declined to provide contingent fee clients a tax benefit by refusing to
329
allow them to exclude their attorney's fees from gross income.
1. The Inclusion Approach is Proper Under the Plain Language
of the Internal Revenue Code and the Judicially Developed
Assignment-of-Income Doctrine
The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Federal Circuits
correctly applied the statutory definition of gross income and properly
held that a taxpayer creates an assignment of income when he transfers
the right to receive prospective income to his attorney. 330 First, while
325. See Coady v Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the statutory
definition of gross income applies to contingent attorney's fees); see also Kenseth H, 259 F.3d at
884 (noting that all receipts, including contingent attorney's fees, are gross income unless
specifically excluded).
326. See Coady, 213 F.3d at 1191 (holding that a taxpayer must include contingent attorney's
fees in gross income because the transfer is equivalent to an assignment of income); Baylin v.
United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the assignment of a payment to a
third party is gross income under the assignment-of-income doctrine); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38
T.C. 707, 712 (1962) (holding that the assignment-of-income doctrine required a taxpayer to
include contingent attorney's fees in gross income), aff'd per curiam, 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1963).
327. See infra Part IV.A.2 (arguing that contingent attorney's fees should not be given
preferential tax treatment over non-contingent fees).
328. See Kenseth H, 259 F.3d at 885 (acknowledging that the same tax treatment is warranted
under both fixed and contingent fee agreements); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 357 (5th
Cir. 2000) (reasoning that there is no justification for treating contingent fees differently then
non-contingent fees for tax purposes); Baylin v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 248, 258 (1993)
(holding that the taxpayer receives a benefit from fees paid to his attorney regardless of whether
the attorney was retained on an hourly basis or on a contingency basis), aff'd, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed.
Cir. 1995). The court in Baylin stated that "[t]he contingency fee agreement merely established
the amount the plaintiff was obligated to pay-it did not specify out of which funds such amounts
had to be paid." Baylin, 30 Fed. Cl. at 258. Accordingly, the court reasoned that the fact that the
taxpayer used a portion of his lawsuit recovery, rather than other available funds to pay his
attorney, did not change the tax consequences of the payment. Id.
329. See infra Part IV.A.1-2 (arguing the appropriateness of a consistent tax treatment of
attorney's fee arrangements).
330. Old Colony Trust v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (stating that "[tlhe discharge by
a third person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed"); see also
Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a taxpayer must
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the definition of gross income is broad and includes benefits accrued to
a taxpayer that are not specifically mentioned in the Code, exclusions
from gross income are statutory and limited to those items that Congress
has explicitly approved of by affirmative legislation. 33 1 An exclusion
from gross income of contingent attorney's fees simply does not fit into
332
the framework established by Congress for permitting exclusions.
Courts that have imprudently bypassed this framework in order to
provide such an exclusion have done so in contravention of the clear
333
intent of Congress.
Second, in correctly applying the assignment-of-income doctrine in
the context of contingent attorney's fees, the Third, Fourth, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth and Federal Circuits correctly recognized that the power to
3 34
control the disposition of income is the same as ownership of it.
These courts properly maintained that, while the taxpayer may not take
possession of the portion of the award used to pay his attorney's fees, he
does receive the full benefit of those funds because he is relieved of the

include the contingent fees paid to her attorney under assignment of income principles); Sinyard
v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 2001) (using the assignment-of-income doctine to hold
that a taxpayer must include the contingent fees paid to his attorneys in his gross income);
Kenseth H, 259 F.3d at 885 (holding that a taxpayer must include the contingent attorney's fees
paid in gross income under the assignment-of-income doctrine); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d
369, 379 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the taxpayer must include the contingent attorney's fees
paid in settling a property dispute due to the application of assignment of income principles);
Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360 (holding that "a taxpayer who makes an assignment of future income
streams but retains ownership and control over the source of those funds has effected an
anticipatory assignment of income"); Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455 (using assignment of income
principles to require a partnership taxpayer to include the attorney's fees paid in gross income);
O'Brien, 38 T.C. at 712 (holding that contingent attorney's fees are includible in gross income
under the assignment-of-income doctrine).
331. See I.R.C. §§ 101-137 (1994) (providing specific exclusions from gross income); see
also supra note 46 and accompanying (discussing the theory behind gross income and
deductions); supra notes 146, 222 (illustrating the specific exclusion from gross income of
damages obtained in connection with a physical injury).
332. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 183 (discussing Congress' motivation for excluding
specific items from gross income). Mr. Campbell correctly points out that the structure of
exclusions under the Code illustrates that only Congress has the authority to legislate exclusions
from gross income and that, as yet, contingent attorney's fees are not among those exclusions. Id.
Mr. Campbell further notes that judicially permitting the exclusion of contingent attorney's fees
violates the separation of powers doctrine because it devalues Congress' taxing power. Id. at 200.
333. Id. at 183.
334. See Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Horst to explain the
rationale underlying the assignment-of-income doctrine); see also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112, 118 (1940) (discussing the rationale of the assignment-of-income doctrine); Campbell, supra
note 1, at 196-97 (discussing the applicability of assignment-of-income principles to contingent
attorney's fee contracts).
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obligation to pay for the legal services incurred to obtain the award.3 35
That the taxpayer must include the full amount of that benefit in gross
336
income is the proper result under the assignment-of-income doctrine.
As the Federal Circuit best stated, a taxpayer choosing to pay his
attorney directly out of the eventual recovery from his claim receives
the benefit of those funds just as if he received the income personally
and then turned it over to his attorney. 337 The uncertainty regarding the
exact amount of the recovery prior to the assignment does not mean that
this amount never belonged to the client.338 It means simply that the
attorney and client chose to estimate the value339of the attorney's services
by connecting the fee to the ultimate recovery.
Further, as correctly stated by the Seventh Circuit, while the
assignment-of-income doctrine requires taxpayers to include all of the
income realized by them, the statutory deduction provisions allow
taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in producing that taxable
income. 34° In the context of attorney's fees, critics view the statutory
limitations on deductions as eliminating any benefit of these
expenses. 34 1 However, the plain language of the Code survives such a

335. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454 (noting that a taxpayer derives a benefit when he assigns a
portion of his recovery to his attorneys in satisfaction of his obligation to pay legal fees); see also
Campbell, supra note 1, at 197; Are Attorney's Fees Payable Out of Judgment 'Assigned
Income,' supra note 206, at ch J.4690 (acknowledging that assignment of income principles
require the inclusion in gross income of the contingent legal fees paid to a taxpayer's attorney).
336. Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454; see also Campbell, supra note 1, at 197 (arguing that the
assignment-of-income doctrine mandates inclusion of attorney's fees under a contingent fee
contract).
337. See Baylin v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 248, 258 (1993) (stating that the client enjoys the
full benefit of the damages award by using a portion of it to compensate his attorney for his
services), affid, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed Cir. 1995). The court stated that "although the partnership did
not take actual possession of the funds it paid to its attorney ... [it] 'made such use or disposition
of [its] power to receive . . . the income as to procure in its place other satisfactions which are of
economic worth."' Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454 (quoting Horst, 311 U.S. 112).
338. Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455; see also B. Douglas Smith, Jr., Ethel Cotnam's Ghost: The
Conflicting Tax Treatment of Contingent Attorney's Fees: Srivastava v. Commissioner, 54 TAX.
LAW. 437, 445 (2001) (arguing that the uncertainty of the amount of the attorney's fees does not
prevent the application of the assignment-of-income doctrine).
339. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that the uncertain
value of a future income stream does not mean a taxpayer cannot achieve gain from anticipatorily
assigning it to another); Geier & Aaronson, supra note 161, at 14 (arguing that a contingent fee
contract allows plaintiffs to agree to measure the worth of their attorney's services by reference to
the gross recovery under the lawsuit).
340. See Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. 399, 417 (2000) (holding that the contingent legal fees incurred
are deductible expenses subject to applicable statutory limitations), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir.
2001); see also I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 68(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1) (1994) (setting forth limitations on
itemized deductions).
341. Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. at 407-08.
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critique. 342 As the Seventh Circuit properly acknowledged, expenses
incurred in producing taxable income do not reduce the amount of that
income. 343 Instead, they create deductions that may be used to reduce
any income tax due.344 That statutory provisions may limit the amount
of the benefit of a deduction does not change the character of the
income, but rather reflects the intent of Congress to tax income
broadly. 345 Indeed, it is not unusual that the realization of income from
an asset is dependent on the work of a skilled agent. 346 However, any
payment made to such an agent is a deductible expense, not an
exclusion from income. 347 Ultimately, the character of contingent
attorney's fees as both an item of income and as a potentially deductible
expense supports the separate treatment of such fees consistent with the
348
majority rule requiring inclusion.
2. Contingent Fee Agreements Should Not Receive
Preferential Tax Treatment
The circuits permitting exclusion of contingent attorney's fees fail to
recognize the absence of a distinction between a client using a
349
contingent fee contract and one retaining counsel on a fixed fee basis.
A taxpayer who enters into a contingent fee arrangement recognizes that
in order to obtain income from his cause of action, he must hire a
competent attorney. 350 This is equally true for a client who retains an
attorney on a non-contingent fee basis. 351 As the Fifth Circuit correctly
noted, the use of a contingent fee arrangement is a means of allocating

342. Id. at 407 (noting that despite the potential for unfairness, the Code must be followed as
written); see also I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 68(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1) (providing limitations on itemized
deductions).
343. Kenseth 1,259 F.3d 881. 883 (7th Cir. 2001).
344. See id. (explaining that taxable income is gross income less the deductible costs incurred
in generating such income).
345. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994) (indicating that gross income includes "all income from whatever
source derived"); see also Kenseth 11,
259 F.3d at 883.
346. See Kenseth I, 259 F.3d at 883.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 884-85.
349. Id. at 883 (noting that there is no distinction warranting different tax treatment of fixed
and contingent fee arrangements).
350. Id. (explaining that it is often the case that to obtain income from an asset one must hire a
skilled agent and pay him up front); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 362-63; (5th Cir. 2000)
(noting that the fact that a contingent fee arrangement has the added benefits of risk-shifting and
realignment of incentives does not alter the economic reality that it is the same as a fixed fee
arrangement).
351. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 362-63.
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risk and reward.3 52 Nonetheless, in the case of a favorable judgment, a
plaintiff would have to pay his attorney's fees regardless of whether he
is bound to do so on a contingent or non-contingent fee basis. 353 The
circuits requiring inclusion of contingent attorney's fees properly
recognize that the economic reality of this conclusion should be the
basis for the tax consequences as well.354
It is illogical that a client who uses a contingent fee arrangement
should receive preferential tax treatment simply because of the method
used to compensate his attorney. 355 While the arguments for exclusion
may often be appealing when viewed from the standpoint of the
taxpayer, these arguments cannot sensibly prevail when the outcome
results in differing tax treatment of attorney's fees based on the
selection of a fee arrangement. 356 In the end, the circuits that permit the
exclusion of the contingent fee portion of a client's recovery only
methods of
succeed in creating an artificial distinction between these
357
payment that cannot survive a test of neutral tax principles.
B. The Exclusion of ContingentAttorney's Feesfrom Gross Income is
Misguided Under Existing Tax Law
The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits incorrectly permitted the
exclusion of contingent attorney's fees from gross income by treating a
contingent attorney's fee contract as a transfer of a property interest
from the client to his attorney. 358 In support of this analysis, the Fifth

352. Id.
353. Id. at 363.
354. See Smith, supra note 338, at 445 (stating in the context of attorney's fees that "[n]o
matter how the paperwork is written, the satisfaction of [a] debt should be a taxable event to the
taxpayer under Old Colony Trust ... ").
355. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363 (noting that an attorney's method of compensation does
not meaningfully affect the gain the client is able to enjoy from a favorable resolution of his
claim); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining that it would be
unfair to give a client a tax windfall based only on his choice of a fee arrangement, because
regardless of the arrangement, he would still enjoy the same economic benefit upon favorable
resolution of his claim).
356. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 362-63 (suggesting that there would be inequity if the
taxpayer could receive the benefit of initial risk-shifting and an exclusion from gross income
simply by deciding to use a contingent fee arrangement).
357. Kenseth II, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 357
(recognizing that principles of tax neutrality require uniform treatment of attorney's fees
regardless of a client's fee arrangement); see also supra note 202 (discussing the horizontal
equity theory as applied to contingent attorney's fees).
358. See Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Estate of Clarks v.
Comm'r, 202 F.3d 854, 857-58 (6th Cir. 2000) (permitting the taxpayer to exclude contingent
attorney's fees based on a transfer of property theory); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125-26
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and Eleventh Circuits improperly looked to applicable state attorney's
lien statutes to conclude that an attorney has an equitable interest in his
client's claim. 359 Although the Sixth Circuit took a different approach,
it came to a similarly unsound conclusion by focusing on the
speculative nature of a claim under a contingent fee contract as evidence
of a partnership between the client and his attorney. 36° In addition to
the transfer of property and control arguments of the Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits, the Sixth Circuit improperly employed equity-based
arguments to permit the exclusion of contingent attorney's fees from
36
gross income. 1
1. A Contingent Attorney's Fee Contract Does Not Shift Partial Control
of a Client's Claim to His Attorney
Until recently, courts permitting exclusion have mistakenly avoided a
full analysis of the assignment-of-income doctrine and have instead
focused on the attorney's rights under the applicable state attorney's
lien statute. 362 Not surprisingly, this tenuous approach has led to the
inconsistent tax treatment of similarly situated taxpayers living in
different states and forces the IRS to administer two conflicting sets of
rules based solely on jurisdiction. 363 As a result of this clearly illogical
364
outcome, the Sixth Circuit recently applied a different analysis.
Ultimately, however, the court focused on the nature of the assignment,

(5th Cir. 1959) (allowing the taxpayer to exclude contingent attorney's fees due to the transfer of
a property interest to his attorney).
359. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347 n.4; Cornam, 263 F.2d at 125; see also Serven, supra note 79, at
83 (noting that the emerging analysis is moving away from the Cotnam attorney's lien analysis in
favor of a more broad doctrinal analysis in analyzing contingent attorney's fees).
360. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857-58 (reasoning that the speculative nature of a
taxpayer's claim under a contingent fee created a partnership between attorney and client); infra
Part IV.B.1 (arguing that the uncertain nature of a client's claim cannot meaningfully affect the
property rights of his attorney under a contingent fee contract).
361. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d. at 857-58; infra Part IV.B.2 (arguing that equity cannot
overcome the plain meaning of the Code).
362. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's approach in Cotnam); Serven,
supra note 79, at 83 (examining the reasoning of courts permitting exclusion of contingent
attorney's fees from gross income).
363. Serven, supra note 79, at 83; see also Srivastava v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 638, 644
(1998) (holding that state law determines what property rights and interest a taxpayer has, but
federal law determines the tax consequences of those rights), rev'd, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000);
Campbell, supra note 1, at 202 (recognizing the inequity that results from the IRS applying
different rules to taxpayers based on where they reside); Serven, supra note 18, at 376 (stating
that "[n]o one can seriously argue that the degree of geographic inequity now present in the
treatment of contingent legal fees is anything but ludicrous").
364. See Serven, supra note 79, at 83 (discussing the shift by the Sixth Circuit from a state
law approach to a broader analysis).
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and improperly concluded that the attorney-client relationship under a
contingent fee contract is comparable to a partnership or joint
365
venture.
The rationale under either theory is that if a property interest is
transferred from a client to his attorney, the client cannot exercise
complete control over the income attributable to the attorney's fee
portion of his claim. 366 Thus, it is argued that because the client never
exercises complete control of the contingent attorney's fees, these fees
do not constitute gross income to the client. 367 This reasoning is plainly
flawed because it fails to recognize that the taxpayer never loses control
over the source of the income. 368 By virtue of their attorney-client
relationship, the taxpayer does not divest himself of ownership or
control of the portion of the claim allocated to the attorney under a
contingent fee contract. 369 While the attorney may advise his client, the
client makes the ultimate decisions with respect to his claim. 370 The
365. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858. Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits were not
compelling in their analysis leading to the holding that taxpayers may exclude contingent
attorney's fees from gross income. See Serven, supra note 18, at 374 (stating that both the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuit relied exclusively on the precedent established in Cotnam). Based on the
reasoning of those circuits, it appears that only the Sixth Circuit independently supports the
exclusion of contingent attorney's fees. Id. Notably, Professor Serven points out that the Sixth
Circuit has twice been reversed or overridden by the Supreme Court on its pro-taxpayer holdings
in the area of taxable recoveries. Id. at 374-75 (citing O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79
(1996); Burke v. United States, 504 U.S. 229 (1992)).
366. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 198 (recognizing that control over the underlying source
of income is the essence of arguments based on a property transfer theory).
367. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857-58 (permitting the taxpayer to exclude contingent
attorney's fees based on a transfer of property theory); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125-26
(5th Cir. 1959) (allowing the taxpayer to exclude contingent attorney's fees due to the transfer of
a property interest to his attorney); see also Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431
(1955) (holding that the taxpayer must exercise complete control in order to include an item in
gross income).
368. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the
assignment-of-income doctrine is difficult to ignore because the taxpayer does not relinquish full
control over his claim to his attorney); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that the taxpayer never gives up ownership over the source of the income); Foster v.
United States, 106 F. Supp 2d 1234, 1239 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (holding that Cotnam did not give
attention to the continuing control that a client, even after entering a contingent fee contract, has
over his claim), aff'd, 249 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2001); see also Campbell, supra note 1, at 198
(arguing that the client under a contingent fee contract retains control over his cause of action).
369. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 362.
370. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2001). Rule 1.2(a) states:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a
plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify
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attorney cannot decide to resolve his portion of the claim without the
consent of his client. 37 1 Further, the attorney does not generally have
recourse if the client decides to end the relationship prior to the
resolution of his claim. 372 Without the ability to make these vital
decisions, the attorney lacks meaningful control over the claim and
simply provides a service to the taxpayer in the hope of receiving
compensation through its successful resolution. 373 Although there is no
dispute that an attorney contributes expertise and may add to the value
of the ultimate recovery, this contribution does not rise to the level of
374
ownership.

(stating that an attorney shall abide by his client's decisions concerning the objectives
of representation including whether or not to accept an offer of settlement).
Id.
371. Id.; see also Grant, supra note 2, at 377 (discussing the lack of control an attorney has
with respect to his client's claim).
372. See Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. 399, 414 (2000) (noting the continual control a client has over
his claim), affd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
373. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 369 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (noting that the attorney has no
control over the "tree," and as such, the fees paid are income to the client); Coady, 213 F.3d at
1191 (noting that a client uses a portion of his award to pay for the services rendered by his
attorney); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2001) (endorsing the use of
contingent fee arrangements in exchange for legal services by an attorney). Rule 1.5(c) states:
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or
other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by
which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall
accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other
expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be
deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a
contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement
stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to
the client and the method of its determination.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c).
374. See Kenseth 11, 259 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001). Although the court maintained that
control is not relinquished by a client who enters a contingent attorney's fee contract, the Kenseth
II court questioned the relevance of this point, noting that owners of income-producing property
frequently relinquish control over the property and are still taxed on the income. Id.
Commentators also argue that the Sixth Circuit's improper focus on the uncertain nature of the
client's claim is unfounded. See Timothy R. Koski, Should Clients Escape Tax on Lawsuit
ProceedsRetained by Attorneys?, 2001 TAX NOTES 126-42 (suggesting that the timing of the
alleged transfer from client to attorney of a portion of the claim under an attorney's fee contract
prevents the taxpayer from escaping the income tax associated with that portion). Although a
plaintiff's chances of prevailing in court may be uncertain, the income eventually recovered by
him is already earned at the time the contingent fee contract is signed. Id. Professor Koski
convincingly argues that the "fruit" in contingent attorney's fee cases ripens prior to the contract
between the client and the attorney. Id. Accordingly, the "client cannot escape taxation on the
'fruit' that has already ripened by transferring control of the tree to another, even if the ripened
fruit has not yet been harvested and the assistance of an attorney is necessary to bring it to
harvest." Id.
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2. Inequity in the Tax Law is Not the Province of the
Judiciary to Resolve
As an initial matter, the Sixth Circuit improperly objected to the
inequity of having the client and the attorney both pay tax on the
contingent fee portion of the client's recovery. 375 The Sixth Circuit's
argument against both parties paying tax on the same income is not
supported by sound logic because it ignores the fact that the result is the
same whenever a taxpayer hires a third party to perform services on his
behalf. 376 Although the method of payment differs, a taxpayer retaining
an attorney using a fixed fee arrangement would have to compensate his
attorney out of his own pocket with funds subject to tax. 377 For
example, a taxpayer who pays an attorney by the hour is taxed both on
the amount he earns as wages to accumulate the funds to make the
payment and on the eventual recovery from the claim. 37 8 Allowing an
exclusion from gross income of contingent attorney's fees would give
unfair preferential treatment to clients based on the fortuitous selection
does not solve
of a fee arrangement. 379 This artificial distinction
380
problems of inequity, but rather compounds them.
The Sixth Circuit also incorrectly advanced an equity-based argument
the application of deduction limitations under the Code. 38 1 Although, in
theory, a taxpayer is allowed to deduct expenses incurred in the
production of income, large recoveries often trigger the application of

375. See Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 2000). The court
explained that in contrast to the assignees in cases like Earl and Horst, who were the object of
gifts and not subject to income tax themselves, there is no similar concern that income from
contingent attorney's fees would escape taxation because an attorney is required to pay tax on his
gross receipts from services provided. Id.
376. Kenseth H, 259 F.3d at 883 (acknowledging that payments by a taxpayer to his agent are
potentially deductible expenses and not exclusions from gross income).
377. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857-58 (holding that the double tax on attorneys fees, if not
excluded, would be unduly burdensome). It is also noteworthy that the gratuitous nature of the
transfers in Earl and Horst did not by itself determine the application of assignment of income
principles. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 361 (stating that "a taxpayer who anticipatorily assigns
future streams of income to obtain services in return has quite obviously procured a benefit").
378. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363. A client's eventual recovery from his claim is not taxed if it
qualifies for exclusion under the Code. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (1994) (providing an exclusion for
damages received in connection with a physical injury); see also supra note 9 (discussing the
method of determining whether a recovery is taxable).
379. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363 (recognizing that the taxpayer would receive a double benefit
of initial risk-shifting and an exclusion from gross income due to the "simple fortuity that he
hired counsel on a contingent basis").
380. See Kenseth IH, 259 F.3d at 885 (stating that a distinction between contingent and noncontingent fee arrangements "flunks the test of neutral principles").
381. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858.
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statutory deduction limitations. 382 While courts on both sides of the
contingent attorney's fee issue viewed this result with sympathy, the
application of such deduction limitations merely reflects the operation
of the statute as currently written. 383 Although unfairness to taxpayers
is always of concern to the courts, it is unsound for them to substitute
their judgment for the plain language of the Code. 384 Courts favoring
inclusion of contingent fees properly recognize that there are many
situations in which taxpayers face harsh tax consequences under the
is a limited one
law. 385 These courts, however, respect that their role
3 86
and does not extend to rewriting the existing tax law.
V. PROPOSAL

Due to the inequity resulting from the different tax treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers, 387 and despite the pro-taxpayer approach of
the circuits favoring exclusion, 388 the Supreme Court should resolve the
existing circuit split and require that taxpayers in all jurisdictions

382. See I.R.C. § 56(b)(l)(A) (1994); supra note 129 (providing the text of I.R.C. §
56(b)(1)(A)(i)); see also Shop Talk, Whipsaw on Lawsuit Settlements: The Courts Still Can't
Agree, 93 J. TAX'N 188, 188 (2000) (arguing that the IRS position results in the nondeductibility
of attorney's fees for purposes of the alternative minimum tax).
383. See, e.g., Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938, 946 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that the
application of the AMT "smacks of injustice because Taxpayer is effectively robbed of any
benefit of the Legal Fee's below the line treatment"); Kenseth 1, 114 T.C. 399, 407 (2000)
(recognizing the potential unfairness to taxpayers resulting from the application of the AMT),
aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
384. See Kenseth I1, 259 F.3d at 885 (recognizing that inequity often exists within the Code is
not the function of the judiciary to resolve); see also Grant, supra note 2, at 381 (arguing that
courts allowing the exclusion of contingent attorney's fees "base their opinion on emotion, not
the law").
385. Kenseth 11, 259 F.3d at 884 ("[llncomplete deductibility here is not surprising or
anomalous or inappropriate."). The Kenseth 11 court also stated:
[Clonsider now the operation of a construction business. All receipts are counted as
gross income, and outlays to subcontractors and materialmen are deductible, even
though these subcontractors have liens on the work and even though the general
contractor could say that he just "assigns" a part of the job to the sub.
Id.
386. Id. at 884-85 ("So rather than ask why attorneys' fees are not deductible for purposes of
the alternative minimum tax, we should ask why those fees should be distinguished from other
miscellaneous deductions that the tax disallows; no answer comes to mind."); see also Campbell,
supra note 1, at 200 (arguing that courts that have permitted exclusion of contingent attorney's
fees have violated the separation of powers doctrine by infringing on Congress' lawmaking role).
387. See supra notes 358-74 and accompanying text (discussing the impact on taxpayers and
the IRS in applying different rules depending on where a taxpayer lives).
388. See supra notes 375-86 and accompanying text (examining the equity arguments of
proponents of exclusion of contingent attorney's fees).
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include contingent attorney's fees in gross income. 389 In addition,
Congress should amend the Code to allow an unrestricted deduction for
contingent attorney's fees incurred in connection with a taxable
390
recovery.
A. The Supreme Court Should Require Inclusion of Contingent
Attorney's Fees in Gross Income
Inclusion of contingent attorney's fees in gross income is consistent
39 1
with current tax law and with Congress' intent to tax income broadly.
The fair imposition of the progressive income tax system depends on an
accurate measure of each individual's gross income. 392 Excluding
contingent attorney's fees from the gross income of individuals using
contingent fee contracts distorts this measurement and provides a tax
benefit to a select group of people based solely on the choice of an
393
economic arrangement between client and attorney.
As the Fifth Circuit correctly recognized, one who pays his attorney
by the hour to represent him in a suit for damages is taxed on both the
amount he earns as wages to accumulate the funds to pay his attorney
and on the total award.394 Similarly, the client who assigns a portion of
his claim in return for representation receives income in the amount of
the full judgment.39 5 That the client does not actually receive the
portion of the judgment paid directly to his attorney does not alter this
result under the assignment-of-income doctrine. 396 As long as there is a
split between Federal Courts of Appeals as to the basic principles

389. See Kenseth H, 259 F.3d at 885; Grant, supra note 2, at 381 (arguing that the Supreme
Court should grant certiorari and hold that contingent attorney's fees be included in gross income
in the interest of uniformity); Serven, supra note 18, at 377 (speculating that the Supreme Court
would hold that contingent attorney's fees should be included absent any contrary indication from
Congress); see infra Part V.A (proposing that the Supreme Court require that contingent
attorney's fees be included in gross income).
390. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 203; see also infra Part V.B (proposing a congressional
amendment to remedy the inconsistent treatment of contingent attorney's fees).
391. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing the broad definition of gross
income).
392. See Grant, supra note 2, at 364-65 (discussing the nature of the progressive income tax
system under the Code).
393. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 205 (exploring the income tax policy issues related to the
proper reflection of gross income).
394. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2000).
395. See Smith, supra note 338, at 448.
396. See id.
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underlying contingent attorney's fees, a fair resolution cannot be
achieved.3 97
The clear weight of authority now supports the inclusion of
contingent attorney's fees in gross income. Perhaps tellingly, the
Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in two Ninth Circuit
contingent attorney's fee cases. 398 However, the most recent decisions
strengthening the majority approach will make it difficult for the
Supreme Court to avoid dealing with this issue any longer.3 99 If the
Supreme Court does take up this issue, it is likely that it would side with
the government and hold that contingent attorney's fees incurred in
obtaining a taxable recovery are gross income to the taxpayer. 4°° This
result would properly impose the same tax consequences to similarly
situated taxpayers and would remove the existing distinction based on
jurisdiction. 40 1 Although the harsh result to taxpayers of such a ruling is
apparent, the problem lies not with the Court but
with the current
4 2
application of the deduction provisions of the Code. 0
B. Congress Should Make Technical Amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code
Even if the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split, Congress should
amend the Internal Revenue Code to allow an unrestricted deduction for
contingent attorney's fees incurred in connection with a taxable
recovery. 403 Although there are various ways that Congress could act to
accomplish this result, the most effective and sensible approach would
be to add qualified contingent attorney's fees to the current list of nonmiscellaneous itemized deductions that are not subject to the itemized
deduction phase-out. 404 Qualified contingent attorney's fees are those
397. See Grant, supra note 2, at 381 (noting that the assignment-of-income doctrine should be
interpreted by the Supreme Court as applicable to contingent attorney's fees).
398. Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112
(2001), Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001);
Serven, supra note 18, at 377.
399. See Serven, supra note 18, at 377 (noting that it would not be surprising if the Supreme
Court agreed to resolve this issue in the upcoming term).
400. Id. (speculating that the Supreme Court would agree with the majority of the circuit
courts and require the inclusion in gross income of contingent attorney's fees).
401. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 203-04 (discussing the positive results of uniform tax
treatment related to contingent attorney's fees).
402. Id.
403. See Sager & Cohen, supra note 130, at 1103 (proposing a congressional amendment to
allow employment discrimination plaintiffs to deduct attorney's fees without special restrictions);
see also supra notes 117-22 (discussing the deductions limitations under § 67 and § 68).
404. The proposed technical amendments would require first that Congress add contingent
attorney's fees paid in connection with a taxable recovery to the current list of non-miscellaneous
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deductible under4 §5 212 and which are incurred in connection with a
taxable recovery. 0
A review of the current itemized deductions chosen by Congress to
retain non-miscellaneous status fails to identify any single common
characteristic.4 °6 However, many of the expenses appear to be those
aimed at ensuring that income is taxed net of any expenses incurred in
producing it. 4°7 This conclusion is supported by examining Congress'
40 8
intent in placing limitations on miscellaneous itemized deductions.
In effect, there are two main purposes for limiting miscellaneous
itemized deductions. 40 9 First, the miscellaneous itemized deduction
itemized deductions under § 67(b). See I.R.C. § 67(b) (1994). Next, these same fees would be
added to the list of non-miscellaneous itemized deductions not subject to the itemized deduction
phase-out under § 68. See I.R.C. § 68(c) (1994); see also supra note 122 (discussing the itemized
deduction phase-out under § 68). See generally Malcolm L. Morris, Determining Deductions
Deserves Deductibility, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 75, 100-01 (arguing for the recharacterization of
§ 212(3) deductions related to tax compliance fees). Currently, § 67(b) carves out several
itemized deductions that are considered non-miscellaneous and are thus not subject to the most
severe statutory limitations. See I.R.C. § 67(b); see also supra note 117 (providing the text of §
67(b)). These deductions include medical expenses, certain types of interest, charitable
contributions, state, local and foreign taxes, and certain other expenses. I.R.C. § 67(b).
Although not within the scope of this Comment, the operation of the proposed amendment
suggests that it should apply similarly to fixed attorney's fees where there is an eventual taxable
recovery. See supra notes 349-57 and accompanying text (arguing the logic of uniform tax
treatment for attorney's fees).
405. See I.R.C. § 212 (1994); see also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (examining
the requirements for deduction under § 212).
406. See Morris, supra note 404, at 89 (acknowledging that there is no clear pattern associated
with the current non-miscellaneous itemized deductions).
407. Id. Professor Morris also speculates that other expenses were not relegated to
miscellaneous itemized deduction status due to political pressure on Congress. Id. at 90. Courts
have recognized that it is "a fundamental principle of taxation: that a person's taxable income
should not include the cost of producing that income." See James Serven, Oral Argument in
Hukkanen-Campbell: Taxpayers' Last Stand?, 93 TAX NOTES 854, 861 n.39 (2001), available at
LEXSTAT 2001 TNT 214-55 (citing Hantzis v. Comm'r, 638 F.2d 248, 249 (1st Cir. 1981)).
408. See I.R.C. §§ 67, 68 (1994). Section 67 divides itemized deductions into two categories:
miscellaneous, and non-miscellaneous. I.R.C. § 67. Miscellaneous itemized deductions are
subject to significant statutory limitations. See I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 68; supra notes 117-35 and
accompanying text (explaining the statutory deduction limitations applicable to miscellaneous
itemized deductions).
Congress also indicated several reasons for the enactment of § 67. See Robert J. Peroni,
Reform in the Use of Phase-Outsand Floors in the Individual Income Tax System, 91 TAX NOTES
1415, 1418-22 (2001) (quoting STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 126, at 105
(1970)). Among them was to raise revenue and promote simplification in the Code. Id. With
respect to the limitations on miscellaneous itemized deductions, Congress sought to prevent
taxpayers from deducting expenses that were personal in nature. Id. In addition, Congress
expressed a desire to remedy errors by taxpayers with regard to the deduction for unreimbursed
employee business expenses. Id.
409. See Peroni, supra note 408, at 1418-22 (discussing Congress' intent in enacting § 67 and
limiting miscellaneous itemized deductions).
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limitations reduce the taxpayer's ability to deduct expenses which are
personal in nature. 4 10 Second, the limitations curtail a taxpayer's ability
to deduct recurring de minimis expenses that cannot easily be linked to
the production of taxable income.411 Contingent attorney's fees simply
do not fit into either category.4 1 2 A payment of legal fees under a
contingent fee contract is typically a one-time expense of a significant
amount and is easily tied to the production of taxable income. 4 13 In
fact, because a taxpayer under a contingent fee contract is not obligated
to pay legal fees if he does not ultimately recover, the arrangement itself
dictates that the expenses cannot be incurred in the absence of
corresponding income. 4 14 Further, in order to qualify for deduction
under § 212, attorney's fees are already subject to initial scrutiny to
ensure that they are not personal in nature.4 15 For these reasons, the
classification of contingent attorney's fees as miscellaneous itemized
deductions is plainly incorrect.4 16 In contrast, allowing such fees to be
deductible as non-miscellaneous itemized deductions would produce a
4 17
more equitable result.
There is no doubt that Congress has made an affirmative decision not
41 8
to exclude certain types of lawsuit recoveries from gross income.
However, the fact that Congress has expressed its desire to tax
individuals on such awards does not mean that it intended to overtax
410. Id.
411. See id.; see also Serven, supra note 18, at 377 (stating that § 67 and § 68 limitations are
"safeguard enough that de minimis items of deduction, often representing expenditures having an
element of taxable personal consumption, will not clutter up tax returns .... ").
412. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (examining the character of the deduction
for legal fees).
413. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the deduction for legal fees under
§ 212).
414. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text (examining the nature and use of the
contingent attorney's fee contract).
415. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the "origin of the
claim" test for determining whether an expense is deductible under § 212).
416. See Peroni, supra note 408, at 1422-23 (illustrating the inappropriate outcome of the
current deduction provisions as applied to contingent attorney's fees).
417. Id.
418. See I.R.C. § 104 (1994 & West Supp. 2001). Congress amended § 104 in 1996 after two
earlier Supreme Court cases narrowed the exclusion. See Schleier v. Comm'r, 515 U.S. 323
(1995) (holding a taxpayer's ADEA recovery fully taxable); Burke v. United States, 504 U.S. 229
(1992) (holding a taxpayer's Title VII recovery fully taxable). The purpose of the amendment
was to tax damage awards in employment discrimination and injury to reputation lawsuits where
there was no related physical injury. See Fred A. Simpson, Federal Income Tax and Personal
Injury Judgments and Settlements, available at http://www.jw.com/articles/details.cfm?
articlenum=81 (citing the Joint Explanation of Conferees on H.B. 3448, Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996). Further, Congress did not want to provide a tax-free "windfall" to a
taxpayer because the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer. Id.
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them. 4 19 Although the definition of gross income is broad, Congress
expressed its desire to allow taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in
the production of taxable income when it enacted § 212.420 Allowing
taxpayers to deduct contingent attorney's fees that are clearly
identifiable as incurred to produce a taxable recovery strikes the
42 1
appropriate balance between these interests.
Perhaps the most far-reaching result of the proposed technical
amendments would be realized by taxpayers subject to the Alternative
Minimum Tax.4 22 Because qualified contingent attorney's fees would
not be considered miscellaneous itemized deductions, they would not be
disallowed under the AMT.42 3 This result is particularly appealing, as
even courts requiring inclusion of contingent attorney's fees in gross
income disapprove of the harsh and unintended consequences of the
AMT provisions affecting taxpayers who hire attorneys to assist them in
recovery. 424 Moreover, removing qualified attorney's fees from the
miscellaneous itemized deduction category for AMT purposes is
consistent with Congress' intent in creating the AMT.4 25 As correctly
recognized by the Fifth Circuit, the deduction of a one-time payment of

419. Simpson, supra note 418; see also Morris, supra note 404, at 88 (arguing that "[s]ection
67 is high on the list of mischief-makers in the Code"); Sager & Cohen, supra note 130, at 1083
(stating that "[tihe attorneys' fees-the cost of producing the income-must be fully deductible
in order to arrive at a true income figure"). Professor Morris suggests that the practical
application of § 67 is often inconsistent with Congress' goal of broadening the tax base while
maintaining neutral revenue raising. Morris, supra note 404, at 89.
420. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment and operation
of § 212).
421. See I.R.C. § 104 (allowing an exclusion from gross income for damages received as a
result of physical injuries); see also supra notes 146, 222 (discussing the exclusion of certain
damage recoveries under § 104(a)(2)).
422. See I.R.C. §§ 55-58 (1994); see also supra notes 124-35 (discussing the limitations on
miscellaneous itemized deductions under the AMT).
423. See I.R.C. § 56(b)(l)(A)(i) (disallowing a deduction for miscellaneous itemized
deductions).
424. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 357 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000); Davis, supra note 187,
at 1722 (noting that the harsh application of the AMT to contingent attorney's fees undermines
the policy behind the creation of the AMT); see also Morris, supra note 404, at 90-91 (arguing
the unfairness of the operation of the AMT when applied to plaintiffs under a contingent fee
arrangement); Simpson, supra note 418 (stating that "[t]here is no reason for [miscellaneous
itemized deductions] to be denied under the alternative system when they are sufficiently 'income
related' to be allowed under the regular tax system").
425. See I.R.C. § 55(a); see also supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing that
Congress' main objective in establishing the AMT was to prevent high income taxpayers from
avoiding tax by utilizing excessive deductions).
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attorney's fees does not reach the level of sophisticated tax scheming
that Congress intended to target with the AMT.4 26
VI. CONCLUSION

As a result of the inconsistency of the current state of the law with
respect to contingent attorney's fees, a uniform resolution is needed.
Under current tax law, including contingent attorney's fees in gross
income is the proper course of action. The plain language of the Code
and the assignment-of-income doctrine mandate this result.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and resolve this
issue once and for all.
Although current tax law mandates the inclusion of contingent
attorney's fees, it is illogical that taxpayers are restricted from deducting
the attorney's fees paid under a contingent fee contract. In order to
remedy the inequity of deduction limitations that distort Congress' goal
of fair taxation, Congress should amend the Code to allow for the
unrestricted deduction of contingent attorneys fees incurred in
connection with a taxable recovery.

426. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 357-65 (acknowledging the potential inequity of including
contingent attorney's fees in gross income); Campbell, supra note 1, at 201; Davis, supra note
187, at 1722 (noting that the current AMT reaches beyond its purpose to areas where it was never
intended to apply).

